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Gentlemen, 
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Welcoming address 
P. LEMOINE 
Information meeting on flammable dusts. 
Luxembourg, 5 November 1981. 
This meeting is intended as a means of informing you of the progress of 
the work carried out by the European Commission and the Safety and Health 
Commission for the Mining and Other Extractive Industries on the prevention 
of dust explosions in mines. In this sector, the ECSC's aid to research and 
the Safety and Health Commission's own work have made it possible to deve-
lop activities over the past few years which we believe to be useful and 
regarded as valuable within the industry, and which are both interlinked 
and complementary to each other. 
Nevertheless, a reproach which is often made and is probably justified, 
is that mine managers are not adequately informed of the aims and results 
of the work already carried out or planned for the future. Although the 
dissemination of information is one of the European Commission's constant 
concerns there is still room for much effort to make information simple 
and effective and to propagate it rapidly. 
Today, we are adopting a relatively modest approach, consisting in supplying 
information limited to a very specific subject to a group of technical 
experts from mining practice. 
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The subject which has been selected is the prevention of dust explosions 
in mines. 
It is unfortunately still a topical subject and, in spite of the progress 
made so far, which we shall learn of in the course of the day, one of 
major concern to those responsible for mine safety. It was in fact not 
at all difficult to find people to inform you about work currently being 
carried out - so great is the desire in every coalmining country of the 
Community to prevent this kind of accident risk. 
* 
* * 
Research into the prevention of dust explosions has always been carried 
out in mining countries and close contacts have been organized regularly 
between testing centres. There is no need for me to give you a historical 
account on this point, or to recapitulate the major mining disasters of 
the start of the century. 
In 1962, however, two serious dust explosions occurred in rapid succession 
and alerted the industry: these were the Luisenthal disaster of February 
1q62 and the Sachsen Mine disaster of March 1962. The two accidents tra-
gically drew attention to the fact that in modern mines, where safety is a 
well-established principle, safety systems, and especially stone-dust 
explosion barriers, can prove ineffective. At Luisenthal, an incredibly 
violent explosion developed in a network of workings and roadways where 
hydraulic stowing was being carried out, and which were therefore very 
humid. At Sachsen, the explosion started and spread in roadways with very 
large sections. 
* 
* * 
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In 1962, the Safety and Health Commission had been in existence for 
barely five years and had instituted work in sectors selected mainly on 
the basis of the conclusions drawn from the Marcinelle disaster (1956). 
During that same period, ECSC research had started in the coal sector, 
with attention focused on the control of firedamp emission, in the field 
of safety, and on the prevention of pneumoconiosis in miners, in the 
social sector. 
The disasters of 1962 therefore caused the Community to revise its 
projects and programmes. 
The Safety and Health Commission accordingly set up a new working party, 
that on "Flammable Dusts", currently chaired by Mr Koch, who, I am sure, 
will give you a summary of this work. 
In the wather of aid to reasearch, arrangements were made to subsidize 
research on the prevention of explosion risks. 
Since the introduction of the Community research projects, a total of 
23 contracts have been signed, representing a total aid of over 3 million 
ECU. It should be noted that the aid granted is only partial, amounting 
in general to 60 % of the research costs, and that the institutes have 
to obtain further financing for the remaining 40 %. The aid therefore has 
a multiplying effect. 
Most work is conducted on a Community basis, i.e. after consultations 
between the institutes concerned, in order to avoid any duplication of 
effort and unnecessary outlays on equipment or tests. A large proportion 
of Community testing is therefore carried out full scale at the Tremonia 
Mine which, as you know, is remarkably well equipped. 
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The research projects which are selected are finally accepted by the 
~uropean Commission after being examined by the representatives of 
industry and the governments concerned. 
Since 1977, projects have been grouped into a first 5-year mines 
safety programme which has just been completed. 
The European Commission had now drawn up a second programme which will 
probably run from 1982 on. 
Explosion prevention, and the prevention of dust explosions in particular, 
has a firm place in this programme. This year, therefore, we will have 
the task of including in this programme projects aimed at improving 
prevention. I am sure that today' s meeting will provide useful ideas along 
these lines. 
In 1962, the initial research proposals first dealt with research into 
the effectiveness of explosion barriers j_n the context of modern mines, 
and work was concentrated on the use of water trough barriers adapted to 
roadways with large cross-sections, including roadways or roadways with 
special installations such as monorails. 
At the same time, research into dust binding, for example by means of 
salt pastes or powders, led to the development of effective practical 
equipment. 
Whilst this work was being carried out at the institutes, the Safety and 
Health Commission collected the findings thus obtained and disseminated 
them in the form of opinions or of proposals to governments in accordance 
with its terms of reference. 
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A new idea then originated, however; that of using a system which outpaced 
the explosion's shock wave to actuate the barrier. 
The use of the light or radiation from the initial explosion were then 
considered, within the context of "triggered barriers". 
This equipment could be used against explosions which are not suppressed 
adequately by the conventional explosion barriers, i.e. explosions which 
are too weak (but dangerous nevertheless) to actuate the barriers, as 
well as against violent explosions. Furthermore, it is thought that this 
type of protection can be employed at locations where conventional equip-
ment is difficult or impossible to instal. 
The work is difficult and not yet completed, and persons who are better 
qualified than myself will today discuss this question which is very impor-
tant for the future organization of mining safety. 
These, Gentlemen, are the points I wanted to make at the start of your 
working session. There are no doubt many others worth making, but I know 
that your time is precious. 
On behalf of the Commission of the European Communities I would like 
to thank in particular, 
- Mr Koch, Chairman of the Safety and Health Commission's Working 
Party on Flammable Dusts 
the meeting's chairmen, Mr Dunn, for the morning session, and 
Y>'Ir Mayne, for the afternoon session 
- the general rapporteur, Mr Reinke, who will draw the conclusions 
from today's meeting 
- all those speakers who have prepared for us a general review of 
their research work 
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and finally, last but not least, Mrs Schneider and Mr Wetekam, who have 
worked hard to ensure that this meeting will go well. 
I declare the infomation meeting open and wish you much success in your 
work. 
P. LEMOINE 
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Introduction to the conference 
on flammable dusts 
L.KOCH 
Ingenieur General des Mines 
With 13 talks and one film, the programme of the conference on 
flammable dusts is a full one. I will therefore be brief and give you a 
quick introduction to the Safety and Health Commission's Working Party on 
Flammable Dusts and the subjects covered by today' s meeting. 
The terms of reference given to the Working Party by the Safety 
and Health Commission are concerned with all aspects of the suppression of 
coal dust ignition in underground mines. I would like to give you details 
of the Working Party's work on the basis of the thirty or so documents 
which it has examined or prepared over the past ten years. 
Six areas have come under study during this period: 
- the memorandum on useful information for the study of coal dust explosions 
or firedamp ignitions in the mining industry has been reworked, revised 
and published by the Safety and Health Commission; 
dust neutralization using salt pastes, powders and flakes developed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany has been examined by the Working Party. It is 
the subject of an information report and recommendation; 
- the technique of water-trough explosion barriers, which has also been 
perfected in Germa~y, has been discussed at length and forms the subject 
of a recommendation; 
- research on triggered barriers has been conducted in most Community coun-
tries. The results have been compared with each other several times by the 
Working Party. I shall not go any further into this area since a large 
proportion of today's meeting will be devoted to it; 
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- the Horking Party has looked into the organization of protection from coal 
d11st explosions in the various coalmining countries of the Community; 
- a number of meetings of the Working Party and of an ad hoc editorial 
committee have been devoted to completion of a recommendation on dust 
binding by means of linestone dust. 
Outside the areas covered by these six topics, the Working Party 
has examined domlffients and assisted other Safety and Health Commission 
working parties in the preparation of draft directives on means of dust 
control during the use of winning and heading machines, as well as assisting 
in the formulation of an opinion on the disruptive effects of hygroscopic 
salts on electrical installations. 
This brief report on the Working Party's activities shows that, 
in compliance with the Safety and Health Commission's instructions, the 
Working Party has always insisted on the preparation and publication of a 
recommendation or information report whenever any question has been examined 
in sufficient detail. 
There are, however, areas in which publication would be premature, 
as in the case of triggered barriers. This conference was proposed by the 
~ecretary of the Safety and Health Commission so that people who were res-
ponsible for mine management but whose contacts with research laboratories 
could only be sporadic could be informed of the latest results on triggered 
barriers. 
Of the 13 talks to be given today, six are devoted to triggered 
barriers. The Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium and the United Kingdom 
will each present two paper·s, one on the results obtained b;y the testing 
centre and the other on the practical aspects of application undergrouncl. 
t<'rance has not carried out an,_v research in this fj_eld recently. 
The other talks you will hear today cannot be placed in a single 
category but do have one thing in common: they deal with research or ques-
tions currently under discussion. 
The subjects of these talks are varied: 
- explosion barriers and their current use in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
- a French study on the behaviour of dust during deposition and dispersal, 
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- recent research on multiple explosions carried out at Tremonia, 
- Cerchar will tell us about their tests on the suppression of weak ex-
plosions, 
- we will hear about the latest developments in Germany on methods of dust 
winding by means of hygroscopic salts, 
- future objectives arresting explosions in the United Kingdom. 
Finally, last but not least, we shall see a film on the use of 
water troughs against coal dust explosions; this film was made on behalf 
of and financed by the Safety and Health Commission. 

Summary of the paper entitled 
Current Application of the Tremonia triggered barrier 
and its further development 
for the Information Conference on 
Flammable Dusts to be held in Luxembourg on 5.11.1981 
Presented by 
Dr J. Michelis 
of the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft MBH 
In the past few years, various types of triggered barrier system 
have been developed with generally the same aims in view in the 
West European coal-producing countries of Belgium, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany two systems have been perfected for general 
operation. 
The Versuchsgrube Tremonia System consists of the triggering device, 
which functions on a thermoelectric basis, and the suppressant 
containers consisting of water troughs with ignition systems. 
Triggered barriers are always useful where conventional explosion 
barriers provide in adequate protection. In roughly 10 operations 
mainly carried out at the Saarbergwerke AG, some 4ooo m of roadway 
have so far been driven under the protection of the Versuchsgrube 
Tremonia triggered barrier. In each case, a triggering device with 
a single sensor was used. 
In order to allow the Versuchsgrube Tremonia triggered barrier to 
be used in broader applications, it has been further developed. 
The new triggering device, the DTS 80, consists of a central unit 
and a maximum of four external sensors which can be linked to this 
unit. 
The main change in the DTS 80 unit is that no mechanical switching 
or plugging-in procedures are required for the test. An infra-red 
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transmitter performs the switching operations optically. By using 
the latest electronic equipment, it has been possible to reduce 
the size of the central unit considerably so that the total weight 
has been halved from 150 kg to 75 kg. With the increase in the 
number of sensors from 1 to 4, the resistance of the ignition cir-
cuit has been increased from 40 to 80 ohms. A maximum of 80 water 
troughs with 80 ignition systems can now be installed, thus provi-
ding the triggered barrier with a much wider field of application. 
Although the basic studies with the Versuchsgrube Tremonia trigge-
red barrier can be regarded as concluded, this explosion barrier 
continues to be used in tests at Versuchsgrube Tremonia. Informa-
tion has thus been obtained on its use in roadways with large 
cross-sections (of about 20m2). New information has also been 
drawn from tests in coal dust explosions with approach distances 
of 180 m. The strong pressure wave preceding the explosion influen-
ced the operation of the triggered barrier in a hitherto unobser-
ved manner. It is necessary for further studies to be carried out 
on the subject. 
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Current Application of the Tremonia triggered barrier 
and its further development 
P~per for the Information Conference on 
Flammable Dusts to be held in Luxembourg on 5.11.1981 
Presented by 
Dr J. Michelis 
of the Versuchsgrubengesellschaft MBH 
The development of triggered barriers providing protection from 
explosions in underground coalmines has resulted in two different 
systems in the Federal Republic of Germany. Both Bergbau-Versuchs-
strecke and Versuchsgrubengesellschaft mbH have designed a barrier 
system ready for practical operation. Although the basic structure 
of a triggered barrier is the same in all systems, triggered bar-
riers can vary from each other considerables in the individual 
elements. The structure, mode of operation and scope of application 
of the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke system will be described in Mr 
Scholl's paper. 
The Versuchsgrube Tremonia triggered barrier system, which is based 
on the use of water troughs in the middle of which ignition sys-
tems are installed, was developed mainly for use in roadways. It 
was planned from the very beginning as a barrier providing supple-
mentary protection from explosions in particularly critical working 
areas. It also had to meet the requirement of being equally effec-
tive in all kinds of explosions, as far as possible. The West 
German coalmining industry has excellent explosion suppression 
equipment in the form of water trough barriers - and in particular 
. 
the wide-action water trough barriers. Nevertheless, these types 
of barrier can only be used in specific minimum lengths of road-
way and certain construction regulations have to be adhered to. 
Since it t~kes up much less space (80 l/m2 ) than a concentrated 
water trough barrier (200 l/m2), the Tremonia triggered barrier 
can be used in working areas where adequate protection from explo-
sions cannot normally be provided. 
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Examples of such working areas are: 
-conventional roadway drivages with high methane emission 
mechanized roadway drivages with full cut or selective heading 
machines 
T junctions 
highly critical working areas such as: 
roadway junctions (in particular points of origin of ventila-
tion districts) 
material transfer points 
bunkers 
central coal-loading stations 
special connecting roads. 
The Tremonia triggered barrier has been in practical operation 
since 1974. Since this type of barrier was not given official 
approval until 1981, the intervening eight years must be regarded 
as a trial period. From 1974 to the end of 1980, the triggered 
barrier was used in eight working areas, mostly at Saarbergwerke 
AG, where the barrier provided protection for the drivage of some 
4 000 m of roadway. The operation of the barrier at Ruhrkohle AG 
has so far been on a trial basis only. 
Since the current version of the system has only one detector, it 
has so far only been possible to use it where there was a risk of 
explosion from one direction only. Roadway drivages have therefore 
been the main ar~as of application. 
In order to allow the Tremonia triggered barrier to be used more 
widely, the DTS 74/2-S unit has been further developed. The new 
DTS 80 version contains a large number of improvements which 
practical experience with the DTS 74/2 had shown to be useful 
and necessary. 
------------- --~ 
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The DTS 80 triggering device consists of a central unit to which 
a maximum of four external sensors can be connected. The sensors 
function according to the thermoelectrical principle and have 
proved successful in over ten years of operation. 
The central unit consists of three enclosures which are connected 
to each other. 
The upper section, an 'intrinsically safe' enclosure, serves as 
the connecting box for one-four sensors. It also contains the 
connection points for the signalling circuits to the underground 
and surface stations. 
The middle section, a 'flame-proof enclosure', houses all the 
electrical and electronic components, some of which I shall list 
without going into detail about their mode of operation: 
a 12 V, 9.5 Ah battery for emergency power 
a mains unit (charging set) 
ignition power production and storage unit (ignition capacitor) 
triggering booster 
power supply for the external sensors 
- monitoring device for evaluation of the sensor signal (test) 
ignition voltage (capacitor) 
ignition circuit (resistor) 
battery (excess voltage -gas emission) 
- signal contacts. 
The 'flame-proof enclosure' is equipped with a panel of three 
instrument indicators, only two of which are used (one for moni-
toring the operation device's and one for switching sequences). 
The indicator monitoring operation contains a panel of 17 light-
emitting diodes which provide detailed information on the opera-
tion of the 1 - 4 sensors and other monitoring instruments for the 
central unit underground. 
In contrast to this panel of lights indicating internal functions 
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to the external observer, the second indicator shows switching 
sequences resulting from signals from the exterior (transmitter) 
to the interior (receiver). 
The receiver behind this panel, which carries out switching se-
quences optically with the aid of lamps or modulated light (infra-
red), is provided for the testing procedure between the sensors 
and the central unit. This is an elegant alternative to the use of 
external mechanical switches and plug connections. 
Contrary to the testing procedure for the DTS 74/2 triggering unit, 
the ignition line of the DTS 80 triggering unit does not have to 
be separated externally. The intrinsically safe battery-powered 
infra-red transmitter (a manual unit the size of a cigarette 
packet) transmits coded infra-red signals through the panel to the 
receiver in the central unit. The ignition line leading to the 
ignition systems in the water troughs is thus switched over, via 
a relay, to an internal signal-storing testing device so that the 
hot water test can be carried out. After the testing sequence, the 
infra-red transmitter switches the ignition line over again to 
make the triggered barrier operational again. These functional 
sequences are indicated by the light-emitting diode panel, as al-
ready mentioned. The maximum ignition circuit resistance has been 
increased from 40J\ to Bolt • It is therefore possible to install 
a maximum of 80 ignition systems, i.e. 80 water troughs. The 
actual resistance reading of the barriers is continuously monitored 
for deviations from the set value. 
The lower section of the central unit, consisting of an 'increased 
safety' enclosure, contains the connections for the mains cable 
(220 v or 500 V), ignition cable and cables for the underground 
external visual or acoustic warning signal. It also houses the 
isolator terminals for switching off the unit, mains supply and 
battery connection. 
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Apart from the further development of the triggering device, it 
was also necessary to design new external sensors. Since the sen-
sors had to be separated from the central unit and suspended over 
the underground roadways, the sensors had to be provided with a 
means of pre-amplifying the thermoelectric signal so that it could 
be transmitted over long distances to the central unit by an in-
trinsically safe system. Because of the various ways in which the 
sensor could be suspended, the protective cap for the thermoelec-
tric elements had to be redesigned. The thermoelectric elements 
themselves are monitored for breakage and the sensor cables monito-
red for fractures and short circuits. 
The redesign of the triggering unit resulted in a reduction of 
its overall weight from about 150 kg (DTS 74/2) to about 75 kg 
(DTS 80). 
Although the basic studies of the applications of the Versuchs-
grube Tremonia triggered barrier system, which were carried out 
under two research projects sponsored by the Commission of the 
European Communities, can be regarded as having been completed, 
the triggered barrier is still included in the current test 
programme. 
As a result, general information on the dispersal of water in 
large roadway cross-sections has been obtained. An explosion gal-
lery with a clear cross-section of about 20m2 is being prepared 
at the Versuchsgrube Tremonia to allow studies to be carried out 
in the type of cross-section commonly found in West German, coal-
mines nowadays. Unfortunately the gallery is not yet available for 
explosion tests and therefore tests have had to be restricted to 
those in which the triggered barrier is not ignited by the in-
fluence of explosions. It is not possible to draw direct conclusions 
from the water dispersal processes observed in such tests for 
cases involving explosions, but the water dispersal occurring 
within a period of about 400 to 500 ms in this "static" process 
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has already proved adequate. This result should be improved con-
siderably when the dynamic effects of an explosion's wind pressure 
are added. 
In 1980, Versuchsgrube Tremonia and Bergbauversuchsstrecke trig-
gered barriers were tested in the Versuchsgrube explosion gallery 
network in explosions with long approach distances. There, the 
approach distance to the barrier's location was 180 m compared 
with the previous maximum distance of about 160 m for explosion 
barriers. This relatively short extension of the approach zone to 
the barrier's location, however, provided valuable information on 
the use of triggered barriers. 
In the case of the Versuchsgrube Tremonia triggered barrier system, 
the advanced pressure waves caused the water to be distributed too 
early in many cases, instead of by the ignition systems in the 
water troughs, since the explosion flame had not yet reached the 
sensor at that stage. Although the explosions were suppressed ade-
quately in such cases, the barriers were less effective than the 
conventional concentrated water trough barriers because they con-
tained 2.5 times less water. 
In the case of the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke triggered barrier sys-
tem, the valve heads were twisted out of position during the explo-
sions despite the use of protective caps. This prevented the bar-
rier from functioning and therefore suppressing the explosions. 
More stable protective caps are to be used and the valve heads, 
including the nozzles, are to be secured to allow the barrier to 
function in this type of explosion,too. Suppression tests have 
yet to be carried out. 
The range of problems involved in the operation of explosion 
barriers in explosions with long approach distances appears to be 
greater than initially assumed, and consequently more studies are 
necessary. 
- 19 -
The ignition systems for the water troughs of the Tremonia trig-
gered barrier are continuing to undergo long-term tests. At a 
testing location, ignition systems have been immersed in water 
under operating conditions since 1974. Single ignition systems 
are ignited at regular intervals, but so far none has failed to 
function. 
In summary, as far as current and future applications of the 
Versuchsgrube Tremonia triggered barrier system are concerned, 
the information gathered since 1974 can be considered very useful 
and it has resulted in the further development of the triggering 
unit and sensors. With the triggered barrier, the coalmining 
industry has at its disposal a range of explosion suppression 
equipment capable of providing a valuable contribution to the 
safety of miners underground in critical circumstances also. It 
only remains to be hoped that appropriate use will be made of 
these means in practice. 
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Technical data of the DTS 80 triggering unit and sensor 
1. Central unit: 
Operating principle 
Electrical connection 
Power consumption 
Ignition capacitor 
Ignition impulse duration 
Ignition voltage 
Maximum response temperature 
Maximum ignition circuit resistance 
Emergency power battery 
Emergency power operating period 
Testing current 
Type of protection 
Signal contacts 
Dimensions of unit 
Weight 
2. Sensor: 
Thermoelectric element 
Supply voltage 
Connection cable 
Type of protection 
Dimensions of unit 
Weight 
thermoelectric 
220 V or 500 V/50 Hz 
5 w 
220 pF/350 V 
2 ms 
300 v 
45 K deviation from 
external temperature 
80 .n. 
12 V/9.5 Ah 
24 h 
0.2 mA 
S ch (d) , S ch ( e ) , S ch ( i) 
intrinsically safe and 
non-intrinsically safe 
700 mrn x 400 mrn x 175 mrn 
approx. 75 kg. 
Pt - Pt/Rh 
12 v 
4 conductors with 
sheating type 
Liy Cy 4 x 1.5 (blue) 
Sch (i) 
length 390 mrn, diameter 
70 rnrn 
approx. 5 kg. 
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The Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke triggered 
barrier system with special reference 
to mobile applications 
Dr E.W. Scholl 
Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke 
In the period from 1963 to 1965, the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke was 
assigned the task protecting firedamp drainage units from explo-
sion. Lightning is a potential ignition source for these units at 
the surface since it can strike the exhaust pipe and cause fires, 
as has frequently occurred in the past. If conditions are such 
that the fire develops into an explosion, the latter is prevented 
from spreading to underground areas by mechanical flame traps. To 
extinguish a fire at the mouth of the exhaust pipe whilst the 
drainage unit is in operation, an automatic fire extinguishing 
system was installed. Various suppressants were tested, e.g. car-
bon dioxide, halon and dry powder, and it was found that only 5 
kg of sodium bicarbonate powder were sufficient to extinguish a 
methane flare fire with a flow rate of 6000 - 7000 m3/h. 
The effectiveness of this powder and the small quantity of sup-
pressant required gave rise to the idea of containing methane ex-
plosions in a pipe of 300 mm diameter and 70 m length without a 
mechanical flame trap by controlled injection of sodium bicarbo-
nate. The explosion is detected by a visual flame detector which 
detonates charges to open the valves of suppressant containers 
within the space of milliseconds. The suppressant in the contai-
ners is under a pressure of 60 bars from a propellant gas (N 2 ) 
and is sprayed into the pipe very quickly when released. Explo-
sions with speeds of up to lOOOm/s have been suppressed in this 
way. - The name "automatic suppressant barrier" was given to this 
equipment, which has operated very successfully for years as an 
explosion protection device for firedamp drainage units. The bar-
rier later became known as the "triggered barrier" in the context 
of underground mining. 
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Vlater trough and stone dust barriers are passive barriers. The 
suppressant has to be dispersed by the pressure of the explosion. 
The flame following the pressure wave then enters the cloud of 
dispersed suppressant and is subsequently dXtinguished. The ef-
fectiveness of these barriers, however, is limited. They can fail 
when insufficient pressure is created in the explosion's approach 
(e.g. in deflagrations of methane roof layers) or when the explo-
sion becomes too strong. 
In contrast to conventional explosion barriers, the triggered 
barrier is .an active barrier whose suppressant is dispersed by 
an independent energy source. Its operation does not depend on 
the explosion pressure and it can therefore contain explosions 
with hardly any pressure. The positive results in the suppression 
of methane explosions in the 300 mm diameter pipe gave rise to a 
study of the suitability of the triggered barrier as an explosion 
barrier for underground mining also. Two pipes with diameters of 
1400 mm and 2500 mm (corresponding to cross-sections of 1.5 m2 
and 5 m2 respectively) with lengths of' 40 m and 140 m respectively 
were therefore installed at the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke. The pipes 
were used to test the triggered barrier's effectiveness in sup-
Dressing all types of explosions occurring in mines, such as 
methane, coal-dust and methane/coal-dust explosions, and defla-
grations of methane roof layers. 
The quantity of suppressant was reduced by altering the extinguish-
ing system, e.g. continual improvements in the detector unit, 
more effective suppressant powder, an increase in the pressure of 
the propellant gas in the suppressant containers to 120 bars, and 
in increase in the suppressant dispersal rate following the use 
of containers with two valve outlets. The number of suppressant 
containers was also reduced by using larger ones with a content 
of 12.3 1. Furthermore, the distance between the flame detector 
and the triggered barrier was varied according to the type of ex-
plosion to obtain the best approach time for the dispersal of the 
suppressant. The approach time is the period in which the sup-
pressant powder which has been released by the detector has to be 
dispersed at the barrier so that, when the flame arrives at the 
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triggered barrier, these is enough powder spread over the entire 
cross-section of the pipe. 
The main result of the tests was that all types of mine explo-
sions with speeds of up to 400 m/s were suppressed with a powder 
containing ammonium phosphate. 
The testing of the BVS triggered barrier system continued with 
underground tests at the Versuchsgrube Tremonia in roadways with 
even larger cross-section. In line with its possibilities of appli-
cation, the barrier was tested in two straight cul-de-sacs: one 
with an arched cross-section of 8 m2 and one with a rectangular 
cross-section of 7m2, as well as at aT-junction formed by these 
two roadways. The suppressant containers were positioned either 
next to the wall in two rows opposite each other, or next to cen-
tre props in two rows half-way up between the roof and the floor. 
They were pointed across the line of the roadway, and the distance 
between the detector and suppressant containers was approximately 
40 m. 
The effectiveness of the triggered barrier already established in 
tests at the surface was also confirmed underground by these ex-
plosion tests. Methane and coal-dust explosions, as well as de-
flagrations of methane roof layers with flame speeds of up to 
500 m/s, were suppressed by a specific quantity of powder of 20 
kg/m2 of ammonium phosphate. 
An explosion barrier used underground, however, must not only 
have an effective extinguishing system but also a detector capa-
ble of triggering off this system at the right moment. An ultra-
violet detector functioning on a highly selective basis was used 
for this purpose. It responds to open flames and is insensitive 
to artificial light, e.g. mine lighting. This detector is availa-
ble in flameproof design. The suppressant containers are also 
flameproof and the detonation valves are equipped with the flame-
proof enclosures used for the extinguishing equipment on under-
ground firedamp exhaust units. 
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Triggered barriers may be used in highly dangerous working areas, 
such as at T-junctions and in roadways drivages. They are also 
suitable dor sealing off ventilation districts where the prescri-
bed distances are not maintained. An advantage of this type of 
barrier in the latter context is that the suppressant containers 
are small and can therefore be installed easily, for example, 
between the support arches at roadway walls, without causing any 
substantial reduction in the clearance of the roadways or tracks. 
Furthermore, when mounted on a mine car, it can serve as a mobile 
barrier in critical situations, e.g. for protecting the rescue 
service in mine fires. 
Finally, power loaders and heading machines, which produce sparks 
likely to cause fires or explosions, can be equipped with detec-
tors and suppressant containers to provide an effective barrier 
against explosions. 
After several ignitions had been caused by selective heading ma-
chines, it was decided to carry out extinguishing tests with a 
modified triggered barrier on a selective heading in a 20 m2 
arched roadway. 
A detector was installed on each side of the cutting boom, poin-
ting towards the heading face, to detect flames. The suppressant 
powder was dispersed through fan-shaped installed radially on a 
ring around the boom, in front of the headlights. The suppressant 
containers were also installed near the headlights. 
Homogeneous methane/air mixtures (9% vol., 12% vol. 30m3, 70m3) 
were ignited by electric sparks between the end of the cutting 
head and the heading face. The ignition location was varied by 
changing the position of the boom. The following five ignition 
locations were selected: the middle of the heading face, the floor 
next to the left wall, the roof over the middle of the roadway, 
the roof next to the right wall and the floor in the middle of 
the roadway. The ignition locations covered all the relevant 
possibilities for explosions and the suppression process. 
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Non-homogeneous methane roof layers of 6 m length and up to 1.5 m 
thick were ignited in the transitional zone between the air and 
methane roof layers, where an ignitable methane/air mixture had 
formed as a result of intermixing. 
To simulate the emission of large quantities of methane, as may 
occur for example during a rock burst, a gas fire was ignited 
with 150 m3/h of pure methane. 
The explosions of homogeneous methane/air mixtures, deflagrations 
of methane roof layers and methane fires were extinguished by six 
suppressant containers, each filled with 8 kg of suppressant pow-
der. The temperatures measured near the driver's seat reached 
approx. 60 C for short periods only. 
A further application for the triggered barrier is as a mobile 
unit in critical rescue service operations. This mobile barrier, 
a prototype of which has already been built, consists of an ul-
traviolet detector, an evaluation unit, an emergency power battery 
and 32 suppressant containers. The barrier is mounted on two 
frames which can be connected easily. The frames are designed so 
that they can be transported either on normal pallet trucks or by 
overhead monorail. The frames have the following dimensions: 
length: 3.17 m, width: 0.84 m and height: 1.8 m. Each frame 
weighs approximately 1500 kg. 
The barrier is equipped with 32 suppressant containers, half of 
which are installed on either side of the frame, and groups of 8 
containers are each linked by one ignition circuit. 
The fast-spraying extinguishing equipment mainly consists of a 
12.3 1 suppressant container, 2 detonating, quick-opening valves, 
2 flameproof enclosures, 2 nozzles and suppressant powder. 
The evaluation unit monitors itself for the following faults: 
failure of the detector, power failure in the entire installation 
and a break in the switched-on ignition circuits. 
The mobile triggered barrier is designed for roadways of up to 
20 m2 cross-section. 
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When it is required, the barrier is taken to the location as quick-
ly as possible, installed as near to the middle of the roadway 
cross-section as possible and the detector is positioned about 
40 m from the barrier, between the possible ignition source and 
the barrier. The detector should be positioned, if possible~ under 
the roof or next to the roadway wall, so that the surface which 
is sensitive to radiation is perpendicular to the line of the 
roadway, i.e. pointing to the floor or the opposite wall. 
The fan nozzles for dispersing the suppressant are screwed on at 
the place of use. They are positioned perpendicular to the line 
of the roadway with the lower nozzle of a container next to the 
valve outlet pointing towards the roadway walls and the upper 
nozzle pointing to the roof at the end of a 90° -curved pipe. 
This prototype mobile triggered barrier has been stationed in the 
central support warehouse of a group of collieries. The barrier 
has been demonstrated to supervisors of the mines rescue services 
and a limited group of rescue team leaders has been instructed in 
the use of the barrier. During a mines rescue exercise, a test 
was carried out to establish how the barrier could be transported 
and handled under practical underground conditions. 
On completion of the trial phase with the first prototype mobile 
triggered barrier, changes which had become necessary and desi-
rable were carried out. As a result, the barrier has had to be 
generally redesigned and therefore a second prototype is currently 
under construction. 
The new mobile triggered barrier will not only have much smaller 
clearance dimensions (a reduction in height and width) than the 
former prototype, but will also accommodate 50 suppressant con-
tainers without its length having been altered. This increase in 
the number of containers should be considered in the context of 
a multiple ignition system which makes it possible for the barrier 
to detect and extinguish a second explosion after being actuated 
by a first explosion. A special automatic system ensures that 
after it has responded a first time the barrier automatically 
becomes operational again after a space of time which varies 
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according to the circumstances. Furthermore, special holders with 
which the barrier can be transported by overhead monorail at any 
angle to the longitudinal axis, and non-rotating high-pressure 
sockets have been developed for the extinguishing nozzles to eli-
minate the lengthy procedure of sereving on the nozzles at the 
place of use. 
This report is intended as a review of the development of the 
BVS triggered barrier system, its basic design and areas of appli-
cation in underground coal mines. 

-------------
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DESIGN, CHARACTERISTICS AND PIT TRIAL 
OF THE BElGIAN TRIGGERED BARRIER 
(P. BROWAEYS) 
For over ten years work has been in progress on the 
development of triggered explosion barriers in the countries of 
the European Community which still have an active coalmining in-
dustry and in other countries where the matter is of interest, 
such as the United States of America and Poland. 
The term "triggered barrier" is applied to any system 
designed to provide an automatic means of arresting explosions 
in mine roadways and comprising at least one explosion sensor 
whose function is to trigger the system together with the appli-
ances initiated by the triggering device, which contain the sup-
pressant material and the source of dispersion energy. 
In principle, such a system must provide selective de-
tection of the explosion to be suppressed and must be able to 
quench the flame within the length of roadway where it is instal-
led irrespective of the strength of the blast. 
Basic lines of approach adopted in the Belgian research 
Conventional (non-triggered) barriers with tipping 
shelves of stone dust or frangible water troughs 
operate only if the blast reaching the barrier is sufficiently 
strong to disperse the suppressant. They are therefore unable to 
quench the flame of an incipient explosion in the immediate vici-
nity of the source of ignition. 
A further point to be considered in relation to conven-
tional barriers is that while the concentrated barrier does offer 
certain advantages, the wide - action barrier is a better means of 
ensuring general explosion protection in mine roadways. 
From the outset, Belgian research into triggered bar-
riers took account of the lessons learned in the work on conven-
tional barriers and is to the best of our knowledge the only re-
search which has produced a triggered system suitable for both 
wide-action and concentrated arrangements. 
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The greater effectiveness of a wide-action triggered 
barrier is apparent from the diagram in Figure 1. 
The position of the sensor D which is effective against the ex-
plosion in question has been marked, on the horizontal axis re-
presenting distance along the roadway to be protected, as have a 
concentrated disperser C (installed at the distance d from the 
sensor) and a wide-action disperser R. 
If the times are plotted as ordinates and it is assumed 
that the flame front advances at constant speed, being represen-
ted by a straight line on the distance/time graph, it is clear 
that if there is to be any possibility of quenching the flame 
this oblique line must intersect the short vertical line repre-
senting the duration of dispersion in a concentrated barr1er tc, 
which never lasts more than a few tenths of a second. The same 
straight line, or any other oblique curve if the flame speed 
varies, necessarely intersects the band tR x it which represents 
dispersion in a wide-action barrier, provided R is sufficiently 
long to be called a wide-action arrangement. 
In trials of a concentrated barrier in a fire gallery, 
it is thus necessary to conduct the tests with different distan-
ces d between the sensor and the disperser and to produce explo-
sions with different flame speeds in the barrier zone for each 
experimental value of d. The experiment is thus complicated and 
the results generally reveal gaps in the effectiveness of the 
barrier. 
It is then no easy matter to take account of these re-
sults when considering the use of the concentrated barrier in 
practice. 
J~o Pucn c.iifficulties arise with a system which can enPure diE=persion 
over a considerable lengtL of roadway as the distance d is no loager 
a necessary paramete1· of the trials or practical application. 
A wide-action triggered barrier, e.g. a few tens of 
metres in length, could keep pace with the advance of heading 
faces, while it would still be possible to install fixed-posi-
tion systems, whether conventional or triggered, further outbye. 
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The objective of keeping pace with the advance of a 
rlri vage face in order to suppress an explosion as close as pos-
sible to its most likely point of initiation involves certain 
operational constraints: the components of the triggered barrier 
must be easy to handle, compact and able to fit into the space 
available in the working area without impeding the work carried 
out; the system as a whole must have sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to requirements and to the configuration of underground 
workings in coal mines. 
It will thus be readily understood that INIEX concen-
trated on the development of a triggered barrier system designed 
to be compatible with practical service requirements and effective 
in both concentrated and wide-action arrangements. As will be 
expl~ined in due course, the system has a 'multipoint' detection 
facility which is sensitive but at the same time selective and 
can trigger dispersion throughout the entire protected zone 
irrespective of the direction in which the explosion is propaga-
ted, whether the latter has already built up to its full velocity 
or is still in its initial stages. 
The Belgian water disperser 
A salient feature of the system as a whole is the 
originality of its explosive dispersion and transmission compo-
nents which make use of the rapidity of detonation. 
These components are mainly located inside the explo-
sive-operated suppressor units which use water as a suppressant 
and are connected in series to ensure its dispersion in the zone 
to be protected. 
Such suppressor units are shown in Figure 2. 
~e~cri£tio~ Qf_a_s~p£r~s~or ~nit_ 
The water container is a PVC sheat enclosing a foam 
cylinder 2 m in length and 22.5 em in diameter. The foam used 
is an open-pore polyurethane foam of suitable porosity. 
- 32 -
The water container weighs 4 kg and is horizontally 
suspended in a robust cradle of wire mesh (weighing 6 kg) and 
filled with 90 to 100 litres of water. 
The cylindrical foam block is pierced by an axial ope-
ning in which a watertight conduit is inserted, enclosing a long 
explosive disperser and t,..an~mis sion :yet em with two branches pro:iecting 
from either end of the water container, their ends being fitted with quick-
acting connectors so that they can be joined ~o .i.ink the suppressor units 
in series. 
·~:he system o£ each unit consits of: 
- a 1.5 m length of permitted detonating fuse containing ll g/m 
of penthri te, disposed centrally in the foam block 
to act as a source of dispersion energy; 
- two lengths of low-energy initiation shock tube whose function 
is to ensure continuity, mainly in the two branches between each 
of the quick-acting connectors and the ends of the central de-
tonating cord. 
Minidetonators containing only a small amount of prima-
ry explosive ensure transmission of the detonation between the 
detonating cord and the initiation tube and at the contacts which are 
automatically established between branches when suppres-
sor units are linked up by means of the quick-acting connectors. 
Qp~r~tion £f_the_s~pEr~s~or ~it~ 
Because the suppressor units and hence the disperser 
and transmission systems incorporated in each unit are series-connected, 
the ignition resulting from an initiating impulse passes from one unit to 
another. 
Figure 2 illustrates such a connection arrangement. 
The connecting lines of initiation tube carry a weak detona-
tion travelling almost inaudibly and with no destructive effect 
at 2000 mjs. 
In each of the series of water containers, the gases 
from the detonating fuse expel the water through the open pores 
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of the foam, which is not destroyed, so that the PVC sheat bursts 
open in all directions and the water is dispersed in the form 
of droplets. 
The various dimensional characteristics of the water 
container and the force of the detonating fuse used as a source 
of energy are such that: 
- the front of water droplets projected in all directions by the 
exploding cord travels at velocities of about 50 mjs, measured 
vertically downwards; 
- about 50 litres of water from each suppressor unit are atomized, 
the rest of the water being expelled later and falling straight 
down from the unit as a deluge; 
- in a plane perpendicular to the axis of a suppressor unit, a 
9 m2 bell-shaped blanket of atomized water droplets, whose 
crown coincides with the unit in question, is formed as shown 
in Figs 3 - 5 within 150 ms and persists for 500 ms after de-
tonation of the cord; 
- at a distance of 10 - 20 em from a water container which is 
burst by the detonating fuse, the instantaneous pressure peak 
is only half that required to burst the most fragile human 
eardrum ever observed (which was burst by a brief overpressure 
of 275 mbar, whereas 50% of ruptures are observed at 1 bar). 
Optimum dispersion of the suppressant is thus achieved 
without any risk of injury to personnel. 
Belgian thermomechanical sensor 
The initial impulse triggering the system is gen~f2i~·ed 
by a device which can react to two different effects of. the. ex~ 
plosion: the blast pressure in the roadway and the heat of the 
' - ,•,_ ' ' 
flame. 
first 
where 
ever, 
I ' ' < ', ':~ J ':,;.• 
The nature of the phenomenon is of course such ~h'l~t' ~be 
of these effects always precedes the second; in .inc:f:d:.hts 
the blast is still in an early stage of develOPDltnt, 1):.()~~ 
it may be useful to be.able to rely on a flame-operkte~ 
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means of triggering the barrier in case the pressure does not reach 
the threshold for mechanical operation of the sensor. 
Qe~cri£tion Qf_the_s~n~or 
The external appearance of the device is as shown in 
Figure 6. It is enclosed in a parallelepipedal steel case weighing 
almost 100 kg and having the following dimensions: 
- height 
- width 
- length 
66.5 em 
30.5 em 
46.5 em. 
Rings are fitted to the upper surface of the case so 
that it can be suspended, normally at the roof of the roadway. 
When so installed, the sensor need not necessarely hang verti-
cally: it may be held to one side by a chain so that it does not 
obstruct the roadway cross-section. 
When the sensor is in its operating position, the two 
opposite faces measuring 66.5 x 30.5 cm2, which are provided 
with air inlets taking up 50 em of their height, both lie in 
planes at right angles to the axis of the roadway. 
The case thus allows a blast wave or flame to pass 
through in either direction while fully protecting the contents 
against all external mechanical damage (falling stones or other 
types of impact). 
Most of the weight of the device is accounted for by 
the case, the removable equipment which it contains being compa-
ratively light and easy to handle although it includes all the 
sensor mechanisms as shown in Fig. 7. 
A description of the sensor mechanisms will be more 
readily comprehensible if combined with a discussion of the mode 
of operation. 
Me£h!nic!l_oEeraiiQn_o£ ih! ~ens2r_ 
The blast of an explosion creates a dynamic pressure 
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wave in the roadway, which causes a vane inside the case to 
swivel around, so that a blade severs a nylon cord which is held 
taut inside the casing parallel to the main axis. 
This releases a hammer acted on by two tension springs. 
The hammer pivots about its axis and strikes a percussion primer 
in a cross piece mounted in the case; this is the point of con-
nection between the sensor and the line of suppressor units. 
Selective operation of the sensor is ensured by a spe-
cial restraining system for the vane swivel, using a calibrated 
pin. 
A second, more conventional locking system prevents 
any movement of the hammer during transport of the sensor appa-
ratus, installation in the protective case and connection prior 
to commissioning. 
Between 1977 and 1981 the following features of blast-
operated triggering with the INIEX sensor were established by 
means of experiments, including tests in mine roadways. 
- The sensor is mechanically operated by an explosion blast in a 
mine roadway at a dynamic pressure of 9 ± 3 mbar (static pres-
sure at moment of operation 78 + 18 mbar) 
- The time elapsing between the arrival of the blast wave pre-
ceding a flame at a speed of 77.5 ~ 16.5 m/s and the operation 
of the sensor is 106 ~ 46 ms (under these conditions 
the operation of the sensor preceds the arrival of the 
flame front is 262 ! 71 ms). 
- No spurious operation of the sensor is caused by a release of 
compressed air at 7 bars at the sensor inlet, by detonation 
of a charge of 350 g of dynamite s~spended in a head end 35 m 
from the sensor or by firing of a round of 40 shots containing 
22.5 kg of dynamite with the sensor 15m from the blasting 
face. 
th~r~al £P~r!tion £f_the_s~n~or 
In view of the extent to which mechanical operation is 
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affected by the pressure level, triggering by thermal means alone 
may be regarded as a back-up mode to deal e.g. with combustion 
of a methane layer at roof level, where the flame speed is too 
low to cause an appreciable increase in pressure. 
When a flame in a roof layer passes a sensor correctly 
suspended at the roadway roof, the nylon cord is severed by mel-
ting without any movement of the vane. 
Severence of the cord, however it occurs, trigger the 
device. In the flame-operated mode this occurs a few tenths of a 
second after the flame has passed. 
Monitoring of the continuity of the system 
In order to derive all the safety advantages to be ex-
pected from a triggered barrier, especially when the system allows 
of a wide-action arrangement, one must be able to monitor its 
continuity, i.e. to check that it is in good working order when 
in industrial service. 
In the INIEX system this monitoring is carried out on 
a constant basis providing a means of immediate detection and 
rapid location of any fault so that it can be eliminated, e.g. 
by replacing a suppressor unit which has been inadvertently dama-
ged in the course of operations. 
frin£iEl~ Qf_the_cQn!inuitl ~oni!oring_sls!em 
An electric circuit is incorporated in the detonation 
transmission line ensuring the operation of the barrier so that any 
break occuring in this line also interrupts the associated cir-
cuit. 
The continuity of the electric circuit is in turn moni-
tored by an electronic device which transmits a selected constant 
signal through it. This signal 1s sufficiently weak for the 
monitoring line to be intrinsically safe (first category) at all 
points on the output side of the wave generator. 
Within the barrier itself, the electric monitoring cir-
cuit comprises an outgoing conductor, whose continuity depends on 
-----·- ------------------- --- ----------- ------ --------
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the transmission minidetonators being in contact and on the 
series of suppressor units being properly connected with the 
sensor(s), and a return conductor, which is in contact with the 
metalwork of all the quick-acting connectors used to link the 
various items. 
The very action of installing the barrier by connecting 
up the various units and sensors thus has the double effect of 
creating a long detonation transmission line and at the same 
time an electrical circuit, the ends of the conductors being 
connected through a diode rectifier housed in a metal case with 
a quick-acting connector. 
The diode case is generally placed at the inbye end of 
the barrier. 
1aye_g~n~r~t.Q.r_ 
At the other end is the lead connecting the wave genera-
tor, which is housed in a set of flameproof enclosures, i.e., 
from bottom to top in figure 8: 
- 1st enclosure 
- 2nd enclosure 
breaker; 
terminal box, high voltage side (220 or 500 V); 
a 500 or 220 V/8 V transformer and main circuit 
- )rd enclosure : a battery with 4 sealed cells, each with a rated 
voltage of 12 V, and a printed circuit card with all the elec-
tronic components, viz. 
1. the stabilized power supply system connected in parallel to 
the battery, which is thus constantly recharged to ensure 
that the device will operate for over 24 hours if the mains 
network breaks down; 
2. the electric circuit whose function is to emit square waves 
down the monitoring line in order to indicate, by a system 
of red and green lamps, whether the circuit associated with 
the disperser line is complete or not; 
- 4th enclosure : terminal box, low-voltage side (the electric 
circuit being intrinsically safe on the output side of this box). 
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Qp~r~tio~ ~f_the_c~niiuuit~ mo~iiori~g_s~siem 
The generator described above emits square waves down 
the disperser monitoring line. If everything is normal, these 
waves are rectified by the diode at the end of the monitoring 
circuit. If the monitoring line is broken, the signal received 
changes and the red bulb lights up in place of the green lamp. 
An auditory signal can, if desired, be actuated at the 
same time as the red lamp, and all forms of signal transmission 
are of course possible. 
A continuity fault may result from operation of the 
barrier or from a defect which can readily be located by divi-
ding the line of suppressor units into sections which can be pro-
gressively eliminated by moving the diode case. 
The robustness of the system and its suitability for use 
in industrial mining applications were assessed in 1977 in a col-
liery operating in the Campine Area. 
A system which was complete except that it did not in-
clude any explosive element and which included apparatus for 
constant monitoring of the integrity and continuity of a line of 
JO suppressor units was installed in the return gate of an advan-
cing face. 
The gateroad was driven by mechanized means and the 
explosion barrier was not moved. One year later, the equipment 
was still in very satisfactory condition, as can be seen from 
Figures 9 to 11. 
With regard to the sensor, the removable apparatus in-
cluding all the mechanisms was taken from its protective case on 
site; it was weighted with about 50 g of dust adhering to its 
various parts and on examination proved to be in working order. 
The same applies to the continuity monitoring system, 
whose response time was checked with Particular care. 
The suppressor units, with one exception, seemed to be 
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intact and perfectly watertight. The colliery had of course ar-
ranged for inspection of the water levels and the units had been 
topped up in the course of the year without difficulty. 
figal £onsid~r~tio~s_agd_f~t~r~ QUilQo! 
The Belgian triggered barrier system which has just 
been described seems quite capable of fulfilling the expectations 
~rising from the lines of approach adopted at the outset of the 
research. 
All its component parts are easy to handle and install, 
comoact and sufficiently robust to satisfy the reasonable requi-
rements of mining practice. 
It can be adapted to different operating situations by 
arranging its suppressor units as concentrated or wide-action 
barriers. 
A single explosion barrier can readily be filled with 
several thermomechanical sensors and if the suppressor units are 
arranged in the wide-action configuration the line is thus equip-
ped with a 'multipoint' sensing system, as mentioned at the be-
ginning of this paper. 
Operation is then guaranteed irrespective of the direc-
tion in which the explosion is propagated. Provision of a number 
of sensors also has the advantage that it virtually eli~inates 
the risk of failure of the sensing arrangements. 
Moreover, there is no reason why a line of Belgian-
t~roe suppressor units should not be combined with a thermal or 
optical flame sensor developed by establishment other than INIEX. 
Such sensors are designed, on receipt of the predetermined signal, 
to emit an electrical impulse which can be used to trigger a set 
of electric detonators. If they were used in conjunction with the 
INI'"~X suppressor units it would be possible to ensure intrinsic 
safety of the firing circuit, which need include only one elec-
tric detonator. 
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THE BELGIAN TRIGGERED BAill1IER SYST~~ 
PERFDRMANCE IN A CUL-DE-SAC TEST GALLERY 
P. Goffart 
In 1980, the system was subjected to performance tests in an ex-
perimental gallery. The following is a description of these tests. 
Generally speaking, the suppressor units form a line several tens 
of metrec in length in the gallery and thus offer the advantages of a ;.Tide-
action ~rrangement. The water-to-air ratio, which is expressed in litres per 
cubic metre of gallery to be protected, varies according to the distance 
between successive suppressor units (each suppressor unit disperses 50 l of 
water in the form of droplets when actuated). 
Again as a general rules the line of suppressor units is provided 
with t~o thermornechanical sensors providing the advantages of 'multipoint' 
detection. 
Only for specific experimental purposes is a test sometimes carried 
out with a short suppression line and/or a single sensor. 
The basic aim of the experiments is to see whether the triggered 
system proves more effective in arresting mine explosions than a conventional 
(non-trit:gered) explosion barrier, especially in the vicinity of the source 
c,f icn:i tion P...nd in cases 1r1here there is only a gradual increase in flame 
speed as the explosion progresses. 
Conventional v:ater-trough barriers are known to be effective 
a~ainst violent dust explosions even if the flame speeds and pressures are 
high (speeds of several hundreds of metres per second and pressures of 2 to 
5 bars), provided the vJater-to-air ratio is right. Such troughs, however, 
are ineffective in the initiation zone of a slovl-pressure-rise explosion~ 
The full-scale test gallery 
The experiments Here carried out in 1980 at the Montlaville quarry 
used b,y the CERCHAR laboratories at Verneuil-en-Halatte. 
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The test gallery is in the form of a blind heading penetrating to 
a depth of 145 m at the foot of a rock wall (Fig. 1). Its cross section is 
trapezoidal and averages 10 m2. 
The gallery is driven in limestone rock with bolted roof and 
gunited walls, its average gradient being 1.5 'fa dipping towards the mouth. 
It is equipped for the production of full-scale dust explosions of 
low or medium strength. The progress of the explosion is observed by recor-
ding the flame front arrival and the change in scalar pressure in various 
sections of the gallery as a ~tnction of time. The recording instruments 
comprise photoelectric cells and piezoelectric transducers mounted in one 
of the gallery walls (the photocells being located at the 5th, 15th, 25th, 
35th, 6oth, 75th, 90th, 105th, 125th and l40th metres and the piezoelectric 
transducers at the 5th, 6oth, 90th and 14oth metres from the closed end of 
the gallery). 
Production of the dust explosions 
Use was made of a standard coal dust and three types of ignition 
source to vary the explosion characteristics. 
,Th!, ~u~t_d!.Jl2,S,it_consisted of Montrambert coal, without admixture 
of inert dust (average v.m. content 24 % daf and inert content 9 ~; ground 
to ensure an underflow of 75 ~ by weight on a screen of 75 micron mesh). 
For each experiment, the gallery was washed and dried. Most of 
the coal dust, which was not mixed with inert dust, was then laid on the 
gallery floor and the rest on raised transverse supporting surfaces which 
could be readily tipped to throw the dust into suspension in the air. The 
type and number of these supporting surfaces depended on the strength 
of the source of ignition: if the blast initiated in the 
cul-de-sac was fairly strong from the outset, the dust explosion was propa-
gated even if much less dust was placed on the raised surfaces than on the 
floor. 
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A total of 300 kg of coal dust was laid at a density of 3 kg per 
metre of gallery so that the concentration in the air would be at least 
300 g/m3 if all the dust were uniformly dispersed in the course of the ex-
plosion. 
The following three sources og ignition were used. 
a) Source 8 
A pile of eight kilogrammes of pure coal dust was raised into 
suspension by a charge of 10 kg of permitted explosive and the resulting 
dust cloud was ignited one second later by a suspended charge of 350 g 
of dynamite. 
This initiating explosion dispersed 4 x 8 kg of dust laid on paper 
strips stretched across the gallery at shoulder level between the fifth 
and tenth metres. Thus strengthened, the blast attacked the rest of the 
dust deposit laid on the gallery floor and a violent dust explosion was 
propagated along the gallery. 
b) Explosive firedamp accumulation ignited with black powder 
60 m3 of firedamp/air mixture containing about 9 % methane were 
prepared in the first five metres at the closed end of the gallery behind 
a paper screen dividing off the methane chamber and the explosion was 
initiated by an electric powder fuse containing 10 g of black powder which 
was suspended at shoulder height in the gas. 
The dust deposit started at the fifth metre, part of the dust being 
laid on the floor and part on 10 tipping shelves, each carrying 8 kg of 
dust and placed at a height of over 2 m on a wooden cross bar wedged bet-
ween the walls. 
The force of ignition depended on the position of the igniter in 
the gas chamber. It was placed either close to the rock face forming the 
end of the gallery or close to the paper screen. 
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c) Firedamp roof layer 
15 m3 of methane were released at roof level at the 21st metre and 
spread as a layer as far as the 35th metre because of the general slope 
of the gallery and the longitudinal profile of the roof. The gas was 
ignited by a thread of nitrocotton which passed trough the roof layer and 
was in turn ignited by a fusehead. 
The dust deposit was laid between the 3oth and l20th metres, partly 
on ten transverse tipping shelves of 8 kg capacity (one shelf every 10m) 
and partly on the floor. 
These were the initiating conditions under which the dust explosion 
developed most slowly. 
- With sources a) and b) the time datum is normally taken as the moment when 
the initiating current is applied to the electric detonator igniting the 
dynamite charge or to the electric powder fuse. 
- With source c), ignition of the gas by the nitrocotton takes place more 
slowly and the times should be measured from the moment when flame is de-
tected by the photocell at the fifth metre. 
'Control' dust explosions 
The CERCHAR technicians provided us with the records of dust ex-
plosions developing freely in the Montlaville gallery, one (experiment No 
1174) ignited by source 8, and the other (experiment No 1042) by a roof layer. 
The results are shown in the form of graphs in the attached Figure 
2 and are also given in Table 2, which will be discussed in due course. 
- 51 -
The maximum overpressures were in the region of 0.3 bars. The flame 
speed was 30 m/s initially and increased all the way along the galler,y to 
reach about 200 m/s at the mouth. 
The blast wave preceding the flame front progressed evenly at the 
speed of sound in the atmospheric air (the phenomenon could be readily ob-
served in this case because of the use of high explosive as a source of 
ignition). 
From the instrument readings it is possible to assess the rate of 
pressure rise, which is indicated on the graph above the 5, 60, 90 and 140 m 
marks along the horizontal axis. The rate of rise was 0.5 bar/a in the vici-
nity of the source of ignition and increased considerably once the explosion 
had travelled over 100 m. 
The flame speeds resulting from initiation of the dust explosion 
by a firedamp at the roof were only about 10 m/s initially and 75 m/s at the 
mouth of the gallery. 
The overpressures did not exceed 0.1 bar. 
The results of experiment No 1042 are included in Table 6 and 
illustrated by the graphs making up F1g. 6, which will be discussed in due 
course. 
This experiment was carried out at our request with a roof-level 
firedamp layer but without ~Y dust deposit (in addition, a thermomechanical 
sensor was located in the gas layer at the 15th metre). 
The optical effects of the flame were recorded as far as the 60th 
metre and lasted for about 300 ms; they were not apparent beyond this point. 
The flame speed increased from 12 to 28 m/s. 
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The overpressure did not exceed 0.06 bar. 
The results of experiment No 1203 are included in Table 5 and 
illustrated by the graphs making up Flg. 6, which will be discussed in due 
course. 
Design of the triggered barrier experiments 
As the test gallery had an average cross-section of 10 m2 and was 
straight, without changes of direction or junctions, while the explosions 
were weak or of medium strength and were to be suppressed close to their 
initiation zone, it was in principle sufficient to have a single suppressor 
unit at any one point in the gallery, i.e. an in-line configuration. 
The line of suppressor units extended from the 15th to the lOOth 
metre and was suspended from a bar placed more or less above the centre of 
the gallery 2.6 m from the floor in such a way that the minimum clearance 
between the suppressor units and the floor was 2 m (Fig. 3). 
As a general rule, in each of the tests thus carried out with a 
single line of suppressor units, two thermomechanical sensors were placed at 
different points along the line. 
Each sensor was suspended in one of the corners between the wall 
and roof of the gallery and was held to one side by chains so that the 
gallery cross-section was obstructed as little as possible (Fig. 3). 
Results of experiments with explosion barriers 
Arrangements for the experiments 1175 - 1176 - 1177 - 1179 were 
as shown in Table 1. 
The results shown in Table 2 were obtained by the use of photo-
electric cells (optical flame sensing) and piezoelectric transducers (sca-
lar pressures). 
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Details of the 'control' explosion 1174 are shown in Table 2 for 
purposes of comparison. 
In none of the experiments with triggered barriers was flame de-
tected at 60 m. The overpressures were of the same order of mignitude as in 
explosion 1174. 
The experiments confirmed the intervals between the arrival of the 
blast wave and mechanical operation of the sensor and between mechanical sen-
sor operation and flame front arrival. 
Graphs of the results of experiment 1177 are attached as Figure 4 
for comparison with those for explosion 1174 (Fig. 2). 
It was observed (by means of a contact installed for the purpose 
at the end of the connecting line linking the barrier and D1) that the bar-
rier was triggered level with D1, 0.23 s after initiation of the explosion, 
i.e. 50 ms after the blast wave had passed D1 and hence, as can be seen 
from the graph, at a time when the wave had not yet reached D2• The barrier 
must thus have been mechanically triggered by sensor D1• 
Bearing in mind that the dispersion process once established 
lasts 350 ms, the gallery was filled with water droplets throughout the 
78 m barrier zone 0.23 + 0.15 a 0.38 s after the time datum. The 
flame was quenched in the cloud of water droplets dispersed in this section 
of gallery at a rate of 1.25 litres/m3 and was not detected at the 35th metre 
or beyond. 
The following apparatus was used for experiments 1201 and 1205: 
- a single sensor placed at the 35th metre; 
- 10 (5) suppressor units disposed in a line 40 m (20m) long between the 
15th and the 55th (35th) metres ensuring a water-to-air dispersion ratio 
of 1.25 l/m3. 
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The results are shown in Table 3. 
The flame was suppressed as soon as it started to propagate. 
Graphs of the results of experiment 1201 are attached as F1g. 5· 
The barrier was triggered 1.16 s after initiation of the explosion, 160 ms 
after the flame front had arrived at the 15th metre, i.e. at the beginning 
of the line of suppressor units. 
Dispersion of the suppressant filled the gallery with water drop-
lets throughout the 40 m barrier zone 1.16 + 0.15 = 1.31 s after the time 
datum. The flame was quenched in this section and was not detected at the 
35th metre or beyond. 
The pressure rises were gradual and it is scarcely possible to de-
termine the rates of rise from the readings. The single sensor used, which 
was placed at the 35th metre, clearly operated mechanically. 
- Experiments with a single sensor 
In experiments 1206 and 1207, which m~ be compared with the con-
trol experiment 1203, there was no dust deposit and the firedamp roof layer 
extending to the 35th metre was thus the sole cause of the explosion. 
The single sensor used was placed in the roof layer at the 15th 
metre. The line of suppressor units also began at this point and extended 
to the 7oth metre. 
To permit comparison with 1203, the test parameters for experi-
ments 1206 and 1207 are shown in Table 4 and the results in Table 5· 
It is clear that a water-to-air ratio of at least 1 li tre/m3 was required 
to ensure that the firedamp reaction was no longer detectable by opti-
cal means at the 6oth metre. Expansion of the combustion gases was halted 
although there could a considerable delay (of about 700 ms ) in the thermal 
operation of the sensor. 
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- Experiments with two sensors 
The following apparatus was used for experiments 1180 - 12o8: 
- two sensors, n1 and D2, placed at the 15th and 5oth metre respectively; 
- 21 (22) suppressor units arranged in a line 82 m long between the 15th and 
97th metres, providing a water-to-air dispersion ratio of 1.25 (1.35) 
litres/m3. 
These experiments may be compared with the control experiment 1042 
and experiment lo89. 
The results of the latter experiment were made available to us by the CERCHAR 
staff. A conventional explosion barrier was used comprising four pairs of 
water troughs of 80 litres capacity placed at the 35th, 55th, 75th and 95th 
metres (water-to-air ratio in the zone between the 35th and 95th metres : 
1 litre/m3). 
The results of experiments 1042, 1189, 1180 and 1208 are shown in 
Table 6. 
A set of graphs is appended as Figure 6. 
It shows the results of the experiments which gave rise to the 
lowest overpressures, viz. the control experiments 1042 and 1203, experiment 
1189 with water troughs and experiment 1208 with the triggered barrier. 
It also indicates the arrangements for the experiments and the 
duration of light radiation at the last photocell at which the arrival of 
the flame was recorded in eaoh explosion. 
In experiment 1208, the barrier was triggered 500 ms after the 
arrival of the flame at the 15th metre. n1, which was located at this point 
in the firedamp layer, operated thermally while D2 at the 5oth metre operated 
mechanically. It is not possible to determine whether the barrier was trigge-
red by sensor D1 or D2• 
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At all events, the explosion initiated by the firedamp deflagra-
tion was 'nipped in the bud'. The equipment installed in the gallery showed 
no signs of exposure to flame beyond the 22nd metre. This is clear from the 
photographs taken before and after test explosion l2o8 (Figures 1 to 30). 
Especially after experiments 1175, 1177, 1180 and 1208, each of 
which involved a fairly large number of suppressor units releasing about 2 
tonnes of water in all, the dust deposit in the test gallery, not only in 
the barrier protection zone but also for a considerable distance outbye 
(in the direction of explosion propagation) was so effectively 1 inerted 1 
that no dust explosion could occur within the time required to take action 
after a mine explosion and to instal a new explosion barrier. 
Wide-action triggered barriers thus avoid 'repeat' explosions-
an advantage which certainly is not offered by the concentrated barrier. 
Conclusions and fUture outlook 
It is clear that in the full-scale experiments carried out in the 
CERCHAR test gallery in 1980 the Belgian triggered barrier system lived up 
to expectations. 
This cul-de-sac gallery of trapezoidal cross section simulates 
mining conditions which are of great importance in industrial practice (coal 
and stone drivages). 
It would be desirable to test the system under other operational 
conditions, e.g. those encountered at the face/gate junction, as there is at 
present no explosion barrier which can be used in practice in such situations. 
In order to carry out such tests, we would have to find a suitable 
location and to be able to count on the same spirit of cooperation as was 
shown by our CERCHAR colleagues. 
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CERCHAR LINE OF SUPPRESSION UNITS IPOSITIO~ OF SENSORS -----------.-----------------------------------------------------
EXPLOSION NUMBER lBEGINNING END LENGTH. WATER DISPERSED (metre) 
NO (m) (m) (m) (litres) (l/m3) D1 I D2 
'-'-' ,. 
1175 21 15 97 82 1 050 1.25 lG 50 
1176 9 15 97 82 t.SO o.so 16 so 
1177 20 15 93 78 1 000 !. 25 35 70 
1179 9 15 97 82 450 o.so 35 70 
TABLE 2 
!MAXIMUM OVERPRESSURE (bar) MEAN FLAME SPEED (m/s) INTERVALS {r:1S} :: 
CERCHAR 
------------------------- ------------------------------------------- -------------------------
EXPLOSION at 5 m at 60 m at 90 m 5-15 m 15-35 m 35-60 m 60-75 m 75-90 m tp I tF t' F NO 
1174 0. 28 0.32 0.24 ~0 75 95 95 115 -
-
-
1175 Oo30 o.2s o.16 32 40 - - - + 80 - 320 - 320 
1176 0·30 0·28 0·16 30 55 - - - + 100 -i:7o -[(70 
1177 0·24 0·22 0 ·16 29 
- - -
- + so - - 270 
1179 0.32 0.32 0.26 40 40 - - - + 140 - 610 - 140 
.. tp is the interval between the arrival of the blast wave at sensor D1 and triggering (observed level with D1) 
tp is the interval between the arrival of the flame front at sensor D1 and triggering (observed level with D1) 
t'p is the interval between arrival of the flame front at the 15th metre and triggering (observed level with Dl) 
TABLE 
. 
!MAXIMUM OVERPRESSURE (bar) MEAN FLAME SPEED (m/s) INTERVAL (me)• CERCHAR --------~------------------· -----------~---~--~-------~---------------------~-----------------EXPLOSION 
at 5 m at 60 m at 90 m 5·15 m 15-35 m 35-60 Ill 60-?5 Ill 75-90 m NO t' F 
•. 
1201 0·20 0.20 0.20 11 
- - - -
+ 160 
1205 0•28 0·27 0·26 21 
- - - -
+ 90 
• t' F interval between the arrival of the flame front at the 15th metre and triggering (observed level with sensor D 
placed at the 35th metre); this is the only time interval which can be determined from the observations. 
TABLE 6 
CERCHAR -'i~~ n~t.9~E~fili~~~--Q>2-r2_. 1-------~~.~!L~~-SJ}l!P i~L~l-•. ------- -------- INTERVAL 
---------·----------EXPLOSION 6 at 5-15 m 5•35 m 35-60 m 60-75 m ~5-90 m 90-105 m 105-125 m 125•140 m (ms) NO at 5 m Ftt 0 m at 90 m 140 m 
1042 i not recorded 45 19 20 75 0. 09 0•01 7 12 30 55 -
1189 o. 21 0.21 0.19 o.o4 1?. 5 17.5 50 55.5 79 79 - - -
1180 0.36 0.32 0. 21 
-
25 50 
- - - - - -
400 
1208 0·12 0•12 0•08 
-
21 27-.5 
- - - - -
-
500 
---
• tF in experiments with the triggered barrier, is the interval between the arrival of the flame front at sensor D1, i.e. 
at the 15th metre, and triggered (observed level with D1) 
TABLE 4 
CERCHAR LINE OF SUPPRESSION UNITS POSITION OF 
------- ----~-~----~~------- ----------------- SENSOR D EXPLOSION NUMBER BEGIN- END LENGTH WATER DISPERSED (m) 
NO (!)G (m) (m) (litres) (l/m3) 
1203 0 - - - - - 15 
1206 6 15 70 55 300 0·55 15 
1207 12 15 70 55 600 1·10 15 
TABLE 5 
CERCHAR ~.9.YER!'l?E13.§1Tl~--i~~~ ----~AF-rr!iJ,~ __ SJ:.E]]_D _(_mj_s.)_ ____ INTERVAL EXPLOSION --------- ti: 
NO la.t 5 m ~t 60 m at 90 m 5-15 m 15-35 m 35-60 m 60-75 m (ms) 
1203 0·06 o.o5 0•04 12 15 28 - 320 
1206 0·10 o.os 0.06 16 13 34 - 720 
1207 0·10 0·06 0•05 11 11 - - 750 
.. tF is the interval between the arrival of the flame front at sensor D and the 
operation of this sensor 
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Fig. 6 
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beside units 20 and 21 
View inbye from the ')Oth metre showing suppressor 
Figure 11 
- 'tO -
View of the intye end of suppressor unit 6 at the 
35th metre 
Vl.Hw towards the mou-th of the ,g-aller.v, showing 
suppression units 6, 7, 8, q and 10 in series 
·wigure 13 
Figure 1.!1 
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View of the ~Jtlet pipe at the 21st metre for 
the t'as l:sed to form the roof layer 
View of s~nsor D
1 
installed at the 15th metre 
Figure 16 
Figure 15 
- '{ .( --
Side •r.iew of senscr n1 showing its connection to the line of s~ppressor units and the diode 
rectifier at the end of the line 
View of the nitrocotton igniter for the roof layer at the 
closed end of the ga.ller~r 
Figure 11' 
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View :fr01n the lOth metre towards the mouth 
of the gallery 
Figure 18 Layin,s of the coa.l dust at the llOth metre 
Figure 19 End of the d111:'t deposit at the 120th metre 
Figure 20 View inbye from the 120th metre 
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Figure 21 View inbye from the lOOth metre 
Figure 22 View of the line of suppressor units starting 
a.t the 22nd unit 
Figure 23 View of the linl:l c:f suppressor units looking 
inbye from tbe 18th unit (80-82 11) 
Figure 24 View of th!! lire cf suppressor units looking 
inbye from the ..;.2th unit (57-59 m) 
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Figure 25 : View of the line of suppressor units looking 
inbye from the 7th unit at 38 m 
Note the step in the roof at the 6th unit 
Figure 26 : Side view of the 2nd unit (20-22 m) with traces of 
exposure to heat at 20 m and not at 22 m 
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Figure 27 : View of sensor n1 and the let unit (16-18 m) 
Figure 28 : Side view of sensor D1 ~ also showing the T connection, the diod.e rectifier afid i;he inbye end of the 1st 
suppressor unit 
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Figure 29 : View from the 2nd suppressor unit, looking 
along the line of units towards the mouth 
of the gallery 
{··· 
J ~ 
. . ' 
.. 
Figure 30 Electrical apparatus for constant continuity 
monitoring of the triggered barrier system 
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Current research on triggered barriers by the Health and Safety Executive 
by 
D. Rae 
1. The SMRE triggered barrier has been described briefly in Technical 
Information Leaflet 'Explosion 1 1 which is annexed to this note. The 
barrier has been approved for use in the UK, after having been tested in 
nearly full-scale conditions, and a number of systems are now in operation. 
The limitations imposed by the tests impose limitations on the installation 
of the barriers underground. Present research is directed towards making 
the present barrier more acceptable by reducing these limitations, and 
also towards finding ways of making such barriers more effective. 
2. The Buxton test facility has, in the past, only been used for tests in 
explosions of coal-dust and air mixtures; it is being modified so that 
firedamp and hybrid explosions may also be made. The opportunity will be 
taken to examine how well the barrier behaves when there is some firedamp in 
the atmosphere in order to determine whether ~e siting of sensors and 
dispersers should be modified in potentially gassy situations. 
3. The present siting of sensors and dispersers has been arrived at because 
no single sensor-to-disperser distance could be found that would be 
satisfactory both for the whole range of explosion violences to be expected 
underground, and for those that could be produced in the test facility. The 
double system was arranged by adding two single systems of sensor and 
disperser together. In a double system it is possible that the action of 
one disperser will be aided by that of the other. It is hoped that tests 
will show that a double system will allow a greater range of face movement 
before barrier movement is necessary, but it is not expected to show any 
large increase. The test zone in the Buxton gallery will be lengthened 
- 82 -
by adding arches up to 140 m. This will lead to potentially stronger 
explosions should a barrier fail, so that the range of strengths of test 
explosions will have to be a little more limited. 
4. Low, wide roadways are not simulated very well by the Buxton gallery; 
however, it would be of advantage, in view of the need for effective 
barrier protection in low, wide roadways, if tests could be carried out 
in a sufficiently long gallery of low, wide configuration. 
5. The SMRE triggered barrier has been developed particularly for low, 
wide roadways, but this configuration, about 2m high and 4.5 m wide, 
causes installation difficulties. In order to ensure that coal dust in 
any part of the roadway cross-section is acted upon by the water from the 
disperser, it is necessary that the point of introduction of the water 
into the roadway cross-section shall not be too far away. A limit of 
2 m has been placed on this distance. It would be of practical benefit 
if this limit could be increased. The 2 m limit is based on findings in 
the Buxton gallery that short, asymmetrical stone-dust shelves. or water 
containe~.are not very effective when more than about 2m away from a 
strip of coal dust, and also because in tests in the low, wide roadway at 
Tremonia, no part of the roadway cross-section was more than about 2 m 
away from the disperser. Current understanding of how coal-dust explosions 
propagate and what effect the water has on thi~ process are not sufficiently 
advanced to enable a theoretical approach to be made. However, if the 
movement of th~ water perpendicular to the axis of th~ roadway,is shown to 
be sufficiently rapid, it may be possible to make a small increase in this 
limit. Although some velocity is given to the water on emission from the 
disperser, the initial speed is limited by the consideration that it must 
not cause injury during inadvertent operation. The penetration of droplets 
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into a stream flowing at right angles depends greatly on particle size, which 
for this barrier is unknown because the water is broken up after emission 
by the explosion. It is proposed to make a study of the movement of the 
water away from the disperser, during explosions. 
6. Various proposals for part-width shelf and water container barriers 
have been put forward over the years; these generally combine the 
introduction of inert material from the barrier into that part of the 
cross-section of the roadway most likely to contain coal-rich dust together 
with a requirement for a high concentration of inert dust in the other parts. 
An examination will be made of how far this concept can be applied to the 
current barrier in use in low, wide roadways. Criteria will have to be 
arrived at for the proportion of the roadway cross-section considered to 
be covered by the SMRE triggered barrier, where the limits of 7 m2 per 
220 -·kg disperser and 2 m maximum cross-sectional distance apply. 
7. Intermediate and heavy stone dust shelf barriers are also installed in 
UK mines, and are also difficult to erect and maintain in low, wide roadways. 
These barriers are capable of suppressing stronger explosions than the 
triggered barrier described above, and a preliminary assessment is being 
made of the operating characteristics likely to be required by a similar 
triggered barrier system that would replace them. 
8. Barriers should, ideally, be designed from an understanding of the 
mechanisms of flame propagation and suppression. The Buxton gallery is 
particularly well suited to the use of scientific apparatus, and optical 
and radiation studies of the composition and temperature of gases and the 
temperature of particles are being carried out. The apparatus is currently 
under construction. The immediate aim of this work is an attempt to 
establish w~ich part of a coal-dust explosion flame is most readily affected 
by the application of suppressant material. The longer term aim is a 
combustion and aerodynamic model of coal-dust explosion that will enable 
barriers to be developed for situations where the simple geometry of a 
gallery is not applicable. 
D. RAE 
16.3.81 
A 
'if' 
Health and 
Safety 
Laboratories 
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Triggered barriers for the suppression of coal·· dust explosions 
When the Health and Safety Executrve was formed at 
the begrnnrng of 1975. the Safety rn Mrnes Research 
Establrshrnent. wrth laboratorres at Buxton and 
Sheffreld. and the Occupatronal Medrcrne and Hygrene 
Labor atones at Crrcklewood were brought together 
The laboratorres have been reorganrsed and therr staff 
and the range of therr actrvrtres rncreased; the 
laboratorres are now known collectrvely as the 
Health and Safety Laboratorres (HSL). 
These leaflets grve brref accounts of rndrvrdual aspects 
of the work of HSL. A general account of the work rs 
publrshed each year 1n "Health and Safety Research 
1977" etc (HMSO). These annual reports also grve 
rnformatron about more detarled accounts of the work 
publrshed elsewhere. 
INTRODUCTION 
Coal dust underground may be raised into the air by 
the blast from a firedamp explosion, and this airborne 
dust may be ignited by the burning firedamp. Combus-
tion of this dust supplements the blast which may 
raise more coal dust as fuel for the flame, and a self-
propagating coal dust explosion may develop. Such an 
explosion can be suppressed at an early stage by a 
suitably designed barrier. 
TIPPING BARRIERS 
Existing barriers in British mines are of the tipping 
type, and consist of a series of shelves loaded with 
stone dust. These barriers are operated by the blast of 
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the explos1on itself to create a cloud of stone dust in the 
path of the flame. They are sited at specified positions 
to limit the spread of explosions originating at or near 
faces. Barriers loaded with water instead of stone dust 
have also proved effective in gallery tests, and can be 
used underground. 
PRINCIPLE OF THE TRIGGERED BARRIER 
Another form of barrier, known as a triggered barrier, 
consists of two parts separated by a predetermined 
distance. One part is a sensor which detects the arrival 
of a flame, and is usually a device that is sensitive to 
heat. The other part is a disperser which receives a 
signal from the sensor and rapidly discharges a 
suppressant material (usually water) into the path of 
the flame. Fig 1 shows a discharge of water from a dis-
perser. The energy used to discharge the water is 
stored in the disperser and does not have to come from 
the explosion itself. 
Fig 1 Discharge of water from disperser of triggered 
barrier 
TRIGGERED BARRIER BASED ON MK II 
WATER DISPERSER 
Since 1967 work has been concentrated on the develop-
ment and testing of a triggered water barrier to perform 
the same function as the light stone-dust barrier. The 
triggered barrier comprises a thermocouple flame 
sensor and the Mk II water disperser !Fig 2} whose dis-
charge is powered by compressed nitrogen. The 
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pressurised nitrogen is retained by a fast-acting valve 
and the water is held in by a retaining plate. When a 
signal arrives from the flame sensor, the valve is 
opened and the nitrogen pressure is applied to the 
water, forcing off the retaining plate. The nitrogen 
drives a piston along the cylinder and 227 litres of water 
are discharged across the path of the explosion within 
about 180 milliseconds. 
VALVE 
I 
t::: II I 
~ 
F1g 2 D~<•wams of MK II disperser 
TESTS ON TRIGGERED BARRIERS 
Tests have been conducted on the Mk II disperser and 
the thermocouple sensor in the coal-dust explosion 
gallery at HSL' s Buxton laboratory and also in the 
Tremonia Experimental Mine in West Germany. The 
tests at Tremonia were made in a full-size arched road-
way and in a low wide roadway, against both coal-dust 
and methane explosions. 
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Thermocouple flame sensor • 227-lltre water dts.perser ... 
Add1t1onal 227 litre dispersers for large roadway cross sectiOns. U.:'J 
~~=~~~ • 
J.-- ------ 60 m ---- ---- Coal 
I" - ----90m ---- ---- ---- face-
~--------------~ 
-- 45m -
fa) Mintmum diStance from face 
~-=--~~-~--~~; =I 
1.- ----- - -80m-- -- Coa 
~ . -·------110m--------- -- face: 
~-~- -------=-:.1 
.,.__ ______ 45 m ---~ 
(bl Maxomum dostance from faoo (f..., has advanced 20 ml 
Fig 3 Recommended siting of triggered barrier 
Different barrier arrangements were tested against 
explosions of different strengths and with different 
types of ignition source. As a result of the test pro-
gramme, a system based on Mk II dispersers has now 
been recommended to the coal-mining industry as a 
suitable alternative to the light stone-dust tipping 
barrier. Fig 3 shows the recommended positions with 
respect to the coal face. For comparison, the first shelf 
of the light stone-dust barrier is sited 64 to 119 m 
(70 to 130 yds) from the line of the coal face. 
ENVISAGED INSTALLATIONS 
Light stone-dust barriers pose problems for the coal· 
mining industry, especially in those places where low 
headroom and rapid rates of advance make them diffi-
cult to install and maintain. In comparison the triggered 
barrier system is compact and can be moved quickly 
once it has been installed, and these should be major 
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factors m its acceptance by the industry. Fig 4 shows a 
typical Installation in a roadway with restricted height. 
Fig 4 Mk II disperser m a low workmg 
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H. Jenderek Essen, 17 August 1981 
Explosion barriers and their current use 
in the Federal Republic of Germany 
The development of triggered barriers has now reached the practi-
cal application stage and, under certain conditions, this equip-
ment is more effective than conventional water trough barriers. 
Nevertheless, there are no signs so far of a general replacement 
of conventional barriers with triggered barriers. 
As a result, we still have to deal with conventional water trough 
barriers. In particular, operational experience has revealed the 
need for changes in the regulations governing the design of these 
barriers, i.e. the 'design descriptions', but only, of course, 
where such alterations are warranted for the salce of explosion 
suppression. 
Some time ago, the Working Party on Flammable Dusts presented the 
former Mines Safety and Health Commission with: 
- an informative report on water trough barriers and 
- a recommendation on the use of water trough barriers. 
These documents were adopted by the MSHC on 22 January 1974 and 
5 July 1977 respectively. 
In them, the Working Party examined in particular the location of 
water trough barriers in mine workings and enumerated their ad-
vantages over stone dust barriers. However, details of the barriers 
themselves, including the regulations on installation of the 
water trough vanity, were restricted to the minimum required in 
the context. 
In order to be able to report on experience in the operation of 
these barriers, I must first of all outline the specific requi-
rements set out in the design descriptions. 
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The majority of water trough barriers used in the coal mines of 
the Federal Republic of Germany are: 
- type 3 for concentrated explosion barriers and 
- type 4 for wide-action explosion barriers. 
Allow me first to give you a review of the main characteristics 
of concentrated water trough barriers, type 3. 
These barriers consist of troughs containing about 90 1 of water 
arranged in groups. 
A group of troughs includes all troughs within a 3 m length of 
roadway. 
Several groups of troughs make up one concentrated barrier. The 
barrier contains at least 200 1 of water per square metre of 
roadway cross section and at least 5 litres per cubic metre of 
roadway space in the vicinity of the barrier. 
The troughs are suspended from supporting frames and/or stand on 
supporting frames or trough supports. 
Supporting frames, trough supports or other fixtures must be 
properly secured to the ground, roadway supports or installations. 
Suspended and standing troughs may be used together within one 
and the same trough group. 
The positioning of troughs in the roadway cross section is most 
important. 
The trough groups must cover 
at least 35 % of the maximum roadway width in cross 
sections of up to 10 m2, 
at least 50 % 
at least 65 % 
- 93 -
of the maximum roadway width 
sections of up to 15 m2 and 
of the maximum roadwa2 width 
sections of over 15 m • 
in cross 
in cross 
The maximum individual and overall distances between the troughs 
within the trough groups are 1.2 m and 1.5 m respectively. 
The troughs normally have to be positioned with their long side 
at right angles to the line of the roadway, but in certain cir-
cumstances one trough per trough group can be placed lengthwise. 
The vertical distance between troughs within the roadway cross 
section may not be 
under 0.8 m 
or over 2.6 m downwards, 
or over 2 m upwards. 
If the distance upwards from one trough is over 2 m, a second 
trough must be installed above it. 
Now we come to the wide-action water trough barriers, type 4. 
Type 4, like type 3, consists of groups of troughs; the distance 
between the troughs however, may range up to 30 m. 
The same rules apply for the formation of groups of troughs and 
their location within the roadway cross section as for type 3. 
F:ach group of troughs must contain at least 1 liter of water per 
cubic metre of space in the roadway section up to the next group 
of troughs. 
The nearest group of troughs to a roadway junction or crossing 
must be no more than 30 m away from it. In gateroads, the dis-
tance between the T-junction and the nearest groups of troughs 
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must be as short as possible and not exceed 35 m. It may be 
increased to 60 m or 90 m if further troughs are placed in this 
area containing a specific amount of water, which varies accor-
ding to the actual distance and roadway cross section. 
Gentlemen, 
These design descriptions, which were adopted at the end of 1970, 
were based on the results of studies carried out at Versuchsgruben-
gesellschaft mbH, Dortmund and Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke, Dortrnund-
Derne. Practical experience in the installation of former types 
of water trough barriers in coal mines was also taken into account. 
We tried to limit requirements to what was regarded as necessary 
at that time for the suppression of explosions, and not to consi-
der intricate means of adapting barriers to individual roadway 
cross sections, shapes of cross sections and fixed items of 
equipment. We therefore felt that we had eliminated, for the time 
being, the problems which had occurred in the past. 
This expectation however, did not turn out to be true. In actual 
fact, the number of cases in which we have had to deviate from the 
design descriptions, i.e. the standard designs, has increased 
over the past few years. The approval of the Chief Mines Inspec-
torate has to be obtained in every case. Most of the cases have 
involved roadways with large cross sections containing the most 
varied types of fixtures and transport in the most diverse arran-
gements. 
Experience so far shows that the following requirements of the 
design descriptions present the most frequent problems in prac-
tical operation: 
- the requirement that 35 %, 50 %, or 65 % of the maximum road-
way width must be covered by troughs; 
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- the maximum distance between the troughs: individually 1.2 m 
and 1.5 m overall; 
the minimum and maximum spacing of troughs downwards of 0.8 m 
and 2.6 m respectively; 
- occasionally, the requirement that one trough only per group 
of troughs may be installed lengthwise. 
These requirements presuppose that most of the roadway cross 
section is available to meet them. In actual fact, this is not 
always the case as shown by the following examples: 
- a belt conveyor with 1200 mm and wider belts, irrespective of 
whether they are installed on the ground in the lower part of 
the roadway or suspended higher up. These problems become even 
worse when the remainder of the roadway cross section is taken 
up by track-mounted vehicles or overhead monorails; 
- twin-strand belt conveyors also used for manriding; 
- and, a recent development, diesel-powered trackless vehicles. 
In these and similar cases, the design descriptions have to be 
adapted or special arrangements made for the installation of 
barriers in the roadway cross section. 
The roadways concerned are both main roadways and mechanized road-
way drivages or gateroads. The latter present special problems 
near T-junctions because of the energy trains located there. 
Preparations for updating the design descriptions for water trough 
barriers have been made by the Committee of Experts on Operational 
Safety of the Steinkohlenbergbauverein and this task will be car-
ried out by mine representatives and the expert bodies concerned; 
. in particular, Versuchsgrube and Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke. 
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However, supplementing the design descriptions with operational 
requirements will not be enough. 
Instead, all notable changes must be based on available explosion 
suppression data or be shown to be necessary by special studies. 
It is therefore not yet possible to foresee when this work will 
be completed and a new version of the design descriptions will 
become available. 
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COMPARATIVE STUDY OF FLAMMABLE DUST DURING 
DEPOSITION, DEPOSITED AND RAISED INTO THE AIR 
R. LIBERDA 
S U M Iv1 A R Y 
This paper is a summary of two studies carried out in the Nord-
Pas-de-Calais collieries : 
~parison of dust during deposition and when deposited 
This study was based on trials carried out using a CPM3 device, 
which is used in France to measure the harmful dust concentra-
tion. This instrument also allows larger dust particles to be 
collected. A comparison is drawn between the differences in dust 
concentration at two points in a roadway and in the quantities 
of dust deposited on plates between the two points. 
Chapters include : a study on correlation, results and a 
conclusion : the CPM3 dust samples provides no sure information 
on the quantities of flammable dust deposited. 
~om£arison of settled dust and dust raised into the air 
Here we have studies carried out on dust deposited in roadways 
and raised into the air during attempts to reproduce locally the 
blast of a weak dust explosion, the aim being to compare neutra-
lization ratios of settled dust and of the same dust when raised 
into the air. A description of equipment used is given. Summary 
of results : there are sometimes substantial differences between 
settled dust and dust raised into the air, even where the regu-
lation ratio of the settled dust is abided by; factors blamed 
are humidity, which plays a part in binding stonedust but not 
coaldust, and hidden dust not discernible through regulation 
measurements. 
Following this is a summary of the facilities we had to measure 
dust 
• during settling; 
• once deposited; 
• when raised into the air. 
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These measurements allow the actual risk of a dust explosion to 
be assessed more precisely. Nevertheless, this research, which 
was undertaken initially by a French coalfield, must be seen as 
forming only one stage of a more detailed study on the dust ex-
plosion danger related to underground conditions. This was the 
object of an application for ECSC aid made in August 1980. 
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Traduction des termes : "empoussierage" et "eropoussierement" 
Ces 2 termes ont une signification differente. 
L'ernnoussicra~e est le poids (ou concentration) de poussiere en susuension 
dans l'air; il est exprime en mg/m3 d'air. 
L'emnoussierement est le poids de pouss1ere qui se depose sur une surface 
donnee par unite de temps; il est exprime ici en mg/metre de galerie/heure. 
Pour eviter toute confusion, je propose lea traductions suivantes : 
ern..,oussiera{!'e 
emnoussierement 
die Staubbelastung (D) 
the dust concentration (G.B) 
die Staubablaeerung (D) 
the dust deposition (G.B) 
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£0MfARATIVE STUDY OF FLAMMABLE DUST DURING uEPOSITION, 
DEPOSITED AND RAISED INTO THE AIR - R. Liberda 
The above title covers two studies carried out in the Nord 
Pas-de-calais collieries, which differ greatly in origin, 
objectives and conclusions. 
The first might be called a 'comparison of dust during deposi-
tion and when deposited' and the second a 'comparison of sett-
led dust and dust raised into the air'. 
I will deal with each of these two parts separately, then will 
attempt to combine them in a synthesis giving more space to 
the question of measuring flammable dust. 
1. ~parison of dust during deposition and when deposited 
This study stems from the introduction of the CPM3 (slide 1) 
instrument in France to measure the harmful dust concentration 
underground. 
Briefly, the instrument functions as follows : the dust-laden 
air is drawn in at a constant rate of 50 1/mn (slide 2), and 
passes through a cyclone where dust particles greater than 
5 ~1 settle, fine dust particles rise to the filter where they 
are collected, with the exception of very fine dust particles 
smaller than 0.5 pm, which pass through the filter and out of 
the instrument. After sampling is completed, the filter is ta-
ken out and weighed to determine the harmful dust concentra-
tion in the roadway. Large dust particles deposited in the 
cyclone, which are not covered by regulations, are disposed 
of. 
All French collieries are now equipped with this instrument. 
Leaving aside the reason for which it was designed, i.e. to 
measure harmful dust concentrations, let us now look at the 
information it can provide. 
From the distribution curve of the CPM3 (slide 3), it can be 
seen that only very fine dust particles less than 0.5pm are 
not collected because they pass through the filter. Since this 
very fine dust only represents a very small part by weight of 
total dust likely to remain suspended in the air, the instru-
ment may be assumed to collect practically all flamma'ble dust 
passing through it. 
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Whence the idea of using the CPM3 to measure the total dust 
concentration of the atmosphere by analyzing the dust parti-
cles of 0.5 to 250pm it collects. 
Whence too the idea of using this instrument to determine the 
quantity of flammable dust deposited in roadways and perhaps 
the frequency with which stonedusting operations should be 
carried out. 
Before a direct experiment to compare the CPM3 and other 
dust-measuring methods was undertaken, preliminary tests to 
adapt the device to this new use had to be carried out. I 
will confine my remarks to the most important test, which was 
to monitor the reliability of the instrument. 
1.1 Monitoring the reliability of the instrument 
This preliminary test therefore consisted in monitoring the 
reliability of the CPM3 by comparing the information provided 
over five days by several instruments placed side by side 
(slide 4); the findings appear on the following graph (slide 
5). There is an average daily dispersion of 16 %, apparently 
due to the lack of uniformity, which is more-over perfectly 
normal, in the dust in a given section, and also perhaps to 
operator handling during cleaning of the instruments. 
The dispersion might seem perfectly acceptable in view of the 
physical nature of the phenomenon being measured, but never-
theless it gave rise to some doubt as to the validity of fu-
ture measurements. 
At all events, it was decided at this stage to continue with 
the test. 
1.2 ComEarative tests with other measuring methods 
whe now come to the experiments proper which consisted in 
comparing dust concentrations given by the CPM3 with other 
measuring methods. 
This series of experiments was lengthy and underwent several 
modifications as experience was gained• I will therefore only 
speak of the most significant tests and findings. 
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1.2.1 Comparison with suspended plates and measurement of 
stonedust ratios 
The initial idea was to set up three measuring stations 
50 m apart in a return airway (slide 6), comprising : 
5 CPMJ more or less regularly spread over the roadway 
cross-section; 
5 horizontal plates hung 2 m in front of each instru-
ment, 
and compare over a given period: 
the information provided by each CPMJ with that from 
its associated plate; 
the differences in the dust concentration recorded 
between stations with the variation in stonedust ratio 
in the same area. 
Nevertheless, no correlation could be found between the 
CPMJ and the plates set out in this fashion, as witnes-
sed by the wide cluster of points plotted (slide 7); the 
best conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a 
virtually exponential fall in dust concentration measu-
red by the CPM3 as the distance from the face increases 
(slide 8). 
Nor was it possible in any way to relate the differences 
in dust concentration recorded between stations to the 
variation in stonedust ratio - no doubt owing to insuf-
ficient precision in this type of sampling (carried out 
using a brush and spatula) for such a comparison. 
In spite of this, the few positive facts noted during 
the test encouraged us to repeat it with a few varia-
tions. 
1.2.2 Comparison with plates placed on the floor between two 
CPMJ 
This time (slide 9) there was only one CPM3 at each of 
the three measuring points, which previous tests had 
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shown were enough to give the average dust concentra-
tion of the cross-sectiona plates were placed on the 
floor between stations. 
The comparison related firstly to the difference in dust 
concentrations recorded by the stations, and secondly to 
the quantity of dust deposited on the plates over,the 
same period; the second figure was intended to give the 
dust deposition on the floor much more precisely than 
the stonedust ratio. 
NB: while the dust deposited on the plates gave a correct 
indication of dust build-up on the floor, the dust on the 
roadway walls could not be determined by such a method. 
So while it was impossible for the two measurements to 
be equal eachother, they could at least be compared by 
calculating their ratio and seeing whether it was 
constant. 
The following graph (slide 10) gives the dust deposition 
expressed in mgjmetre of roadway/hour given by the CPM3 
between stations 1 and 2, 2 and 3 and 1 and 3 along the 
x-axis, and the dust deposition on the floor given by the 
plate placed between stations and expressed in the same 
units along the y-axis. 
This gives us an average 34% dust deposited on the floor 
and the rest on roadway walls. 
However logical and encouraging this result might appear, 
the following remarks must be made: 
the dispersion in these ratios, with a standard devia-
~ion of 26 %, is significant, in spite of the rigo-
rousness with which the test was conducted, in parti-
cular the continuous monitoring by the person respon-
sible; 
the only relative reliability of the instrument and 
the lack of uniformity in the dust concentration in 
the roadway cross-section mentioned above are certain-
ly reasons for this lack of precision; it must be 
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borne in mind that what is acceptable in assessing a 
harmful dust concentration whose cumulative effect 
(i.e. the danger threshold) is measured in decades is 
not so at all for flammable dust where the cumulative 
effect is measured in days, or even in shifts; 
in measuring the dust deposition in roadways, this 
instrument does not take account of dust conveyed 
other than through the air (e.g. by conveyors or ma-
chines), nor of local falls of dust. These factors may 
considerably affect the dust deposition in conveyor 
roads. 
furthermore, since the time for the next stonedusting 
operation depends on the amount of dust deposited, it 
can easily be shown that measuring neutralization ra-
tios, according to French regulations, on the surface 
layer of dust deposits will require a new stonedusting 
operation before the instrument does; 
lastly, supposing that in spite of everything a stone-
dusting frequency can be worked out, this rate depends 
in the last analysis on the contraints imposed by ope-
rations, which mean that stonedusting can practically 
only be carried out on weekends. 
For all these reasons, the CPM3 does not seem capable of 
providing reliable information on the dust risk level in 
roadways despite all the positive aspects which led to 
its being tested to this end. 
Moreover, the dust risk depends on other factors, as 
will be seen in the second part of this paper. In con-
clusion, it should be noted that the CPM3 only measures 
dust during de;eosi tion, and that there ·if.~ an important 
stage between this state and the state in which the dust, 
once deposited, may or may not form a cloud capable of 
transmitting an explosion; this may stand as the conclu-
sion to the first part. 
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2. Comparison of settled dust and dust raised into the air 
As explained in my introduction, this research was carried out 
independently of the previous project; I conducted it under 
the direction of Mr Augustin Coquide, whom I should like to 
thank for the energy and tenacity he showed. 
This study follows on several unanswered questions arising 
after the Lievin catastrophe: 
how coul1 a dust explosion be propagated in roadways where 
the neutralization ratio was above the regulation one? 
did that simply mean that the neutralization ratios laid 
down in French regulations should be queried, or did it 
imply ignorance of some dust explosion mechanisms on the 
part of research institutes and the industry in general? 
It then occurred to researchers that regulations had always 
been based on trials carried out in experimental galleries; 
for consistency reasons, these trials always involved homoge-
neous mixtures of coal dust and inerts spread through-out the 
roadway. 
It is perfectly obviously that such conditions have little in 
common with the actual situation in mine roadways. One need 
only note that coal dust settles almost continually, since it 
is a direct product of coal winning, whereas stonedusting 
takes little time and is generally carried out once a week; 
the dust deposit underground is thus a complex pile of coal 
and inerts. Added to this is the binding power of dampness 
which acts differently on coal and on stonedust. This abun-
dantly demonstrates to what extent this state of affairs dif-
fers from conditions in experimental galleries. 
It therefore seemed logical to find a way of showing the dust 
actually involved in an explosion, the basic idea was to at-
tempt to reproduce locally the blast of a slow-moving explo-
sion under conditions which did not present any danger under-
ground, and study the dust raised into the air. 
Two methods were used in all. The first consisted in directing 
a stream of air onto a surface of several dm2 covered by an 
enclosure. 
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With the first type of apparatus (slide 11), the dust was rai-
se~ by a tangential stream of air or nitrogen at a pressure of 
50 m/s, or simply by the operator blowing at 10 m/s. The dust 
raised into the air was redeposited on slide-out shelves, 
collected with a brush (slide 12) and analyzed; this apparatus 
was made of transparent plexiglass and used mainly on the 
floor, each measurement took six minutes; 
In the other sort of apparatus (slide 13), the surface onto 
which the stream of air was directed was circular and the dust 
raised into the air was deposited on a paper filter which was 
then removed, folded together with the dust it contained and 
sent to the laboratory (measuring time: one minute). The fil-
ter was burnt along with the dust and since the weight of its 
ash remains were known, the stonedust ratio was worked out 
with a maximum error of one percent. 
The second method (slide 14) consisted in directing a stream 
of compressed air onto the roadway surfaces, at a tangential 
speed of the order of 50 m/s. 
The dust was collected on plates suspended several metres 
downwind. Before each operation, the stonedust ratio of the 
settled dust was measured. 
It would take too long to give all the quantitative findings; 
they point to the sometimes substantial differences between 
the stonedust ratio of a dust layer on the roadway and that 
of the same dust layer when disturbed by a stream of air. 
The following observations arise from the findings as a whole: 
in roadways which are frequently subjected to intensive stone-
dusting using the CPOAC, the stonedust ratio of dust raised 
into the air is very close to that of the dust remaining, that 
can easily be explained by the fact that the stream of air 
raises dust below the surface where there is a lot of stone-
dust. 
On the other hand, where a roadway is stonedusted less fre-
quently and is subject to damp, the stonedust ratio of dust 
raised into the air are generally much lower than those of the 
dust remaining, though it has a correct regulation ratio; 
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the stream of air acts predominantly on the coal dust whereas 
the more hydrophilic stonedust tends to remain bound. 
Thanks to these trials it was also observed that a stream of 
compressed air directed freely against, for example, the road-
way walls showed the danger presented by coal dust hidden be-
hind the support units, boards and crumbling surfaces which 
only a blast of air may dislodge. 
Lastly, let us note that the process of blowing air inside an 
enclosure showed what weight of coal dust could be raised in 
the air per square meter of roadway, and this should be compa-
red with the lower explosibility limit which is 50 g/mJ. 
All these observations give us an idea of what a weak explo-
sion may be, and why it has remained for so long a little-
known phenomenon so difficult to foresee using traditional 
methods for measuring deposited dust. 
Unfortunately I have only been able to give a cursory descrip-
tion of a very vast range of experiments, the results of which 
fill several reports without exhausting the topic. 
This study could form part of a wider range of aids in the 
understanding of dust deposits; these may be divided into 
(slide 15): 
-measuring dust during deposition, an example of which we saw 
with the CPMJ; 
-measuring deposited dust, which is practised according to 
regulations in almost all mining countries; 
- measuring dust raised into the air, of which I have just 
spoken in the second part. 
All this brings us closer and closer to an ever more precise 
assessment of the risk presented by dust should there be an 
explosion. 
Nevertheless, however extensive this research might appear, it 
still remains only an introduction to the problem; critisism 
could rightly be levelled at it for the relatively small popu-
lation of measurements (about 60) for dust raised into the air. 
-~-
These initial observations underground should therefore be 
confirmed by a larger series of measurements. 
Supposing this was done, the basic problem remains the same, 
i.e.: will the explosion be propagated or not, bearing in mind 
that this depends also on other factors such as: 
the effect of the flame's heat in drying, splitting up and 
then volatilizing dust initially damp and not likely to be 
raised into the air; 
- the conveyance of dust by a blast far from its original 
position, 
the influence of 'channels' which allow an explosion to be 
transmitted without its taking up the whole cross-section of 
the roadway. 
the answer to these questions could be found this time in an 
experimental gallery. Here weak explosions could be carried 
out by reproducing- and this is vital - the dust deposition 
conditions underground by introducing: 
an air current, 
a deposit of dust with dust concentration ratings comparable 
with those of our workingsa 
stonedusting carried out witq the same devices as under-
ground, 
a degree of humidity in the air so that it plays its part in 
the formation and binding of the dust that has collected. 
These experiments would then show how the various parameters 
listed were responsible for the propagation of an explosion; 
measurements of dust deposited and raised into the air would 
be carried out before ignitiona these tests could also include 
the effect of safety barriers on weak explosions under such 
conditions. 
As can be seen, research of this scope is beyond the means of 
our collieries, I would go as far as to say that technically 
and financially this problem does not only concern the 
Charbonnages de France but involves the whole industry. 
- 109 -
The application for ECSC assistance submitted in August 1980 
by the Charbonnages de France was made in this spirit. 
Bearing in mind that after the Lievin disaster (which all the 
same brought home the importance of weak dust explosions), 
other disasters of the same type have occurred in Europe, it 
is imperative to know what precautions would finally provide 
lasting protection for the miner. 
Such experimental research would in my opinion, be of the 
greatest advantage for the collective safety of the industry. 
R. LIBERDA 
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SLIDES TO GO WITH THE PAPER 
COMPARATIVE S'IUDY OF FLAMMABLE IUST 
DURING DEPOSITION, DEPOSITED AND 
RAISED INTO THE AIR 
Fig. 1. CPM3 type dust 
s8lllpler 
Fig. 2. CPM3 saaplera 
principle of 
operation 
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Fig. 4 Monitoring the reliability of the CPM3: 
arrangement of units in roadway 
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Fig. 5 Monitoring the reliability of the CPM3: 
dispersion of findings over five days' testing 
. Fig. 6 Comparing findings from CPM3 and suspended plates: 
arrangement of units in roadway 
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Fig. 9 Comparing findings from CPM3 and plates on floor: 
arrangement of units in roadway 
Dust deposition on plates (g/m/hour) 
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Fig. 10 Comparing findings from CPM3 and plates on floor: 
correlation between the two measuring methods 
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SURFACE TO 
BE EXPOSED TO AIR CURRENT slide-out 
shelves 
compressed air 
foam filters 
Fig. 11 Enclosure with slide-out shelves for measuring 
dust deposition: 
blowing air against the roadway floor 
Fig. 12 Enclosure with slide-out shelves for measuring 
dust deposition: 
collecting the dust raised into the air 
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ELASTIC BAND FILTER 
Fig. 13 Enclosure with filter for measuring dust 
raised into the air 
Fig. 14 Blowing air freely around the roadway cross-section 
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Summary of the paper entitled 
'Activiti$5 in the field of multiple explosions' 
for the Information Conference on 
~Flammable Dusts' to be held in Luxembourg on 5.11.1981, 
presented by Dr H. Meerbach 
o! the VBRSUCHSGRUBENGESELLSCHAFT MBH 
There is always a risk of explosions when open or concealed mine 
fires ooeur. 'hey may take the form of multiple explosions, with 
intervals (between the explosions of several minutes to several 
hours) depending on the ventilation conditions. 
The mine reaoue teams lhould be protected by the existing explo-
sion barriers if possible whilst carrying out the stopping-off 
operatiqns. In the event of fires, other means are also generally 
employed to su~press explosions. The effects of explosions can be 
kept within limits in most cases by the use of rapidly erected 
barriers, called •rapid barriers• in Germany, consisting of sus-
pended water troughs. Recently, the risk of explosions has been 
greatly reduced, if not completely eliminated, in the Federal 
Republic of Germany bY the increased injection of nitrogen into 
fire areas. 
Nevertheleae, it was considered desirable to examine the protec-
ti v·e innu.en.oe, in aul tiple explosions, of the stone dust and wa-
ter trousb barriers currently in use. 
In order to conduet multiple explosion tests with explosions at 
intervals of less than 24 hours, appropriate mining and measuring 
arrang•ment~ had to be m~de in the explosion gallery network of 
Versuehsgrube Tremonia to allow a secondary explosion to be igni-
ted after the primary explosion without the involvement of 
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additional underground operations. Special testing arrangements 
made it possible for multiple explosions to be produced at mini-
mum intervals of 20 minutes. 
The effectiveness of the explosion barriers against the secondary 
explosion depended more or less on their effectiveness against 
the primary explosion. The more effective they were in ·suppressing 
the primary explosion, the less effective they were in neutrali-
zing the secondary one. The character of the secondary explosion 
mainly depended on the combustible material left over from the 
primary explosion. The inert material which had already been 
ejected had hardly any dampening effect, or none at all, on the 
secondary explosion. 
Further explosion tests are to be carried out as part of a research 
project of the Commission of the European Communities at the 
Versuchsgrube Tremonia in order to examine means of suppressing 
a secondary or multiple explosion. 
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'Activities in the field of muitiple explosions' 
for the Information Conference on 
tp1~~1~ DUsts• to be held in Luxembourg on 5.11.1981, 
presented by Dr H. Meerbach 
of the VERSUCHSGRUBENGESELLSCHAFT MBH 
the prohieMs caused by the possibility of double or multiple ex-
~ldsidrts were discussed in paper B 3 which I presented at the 
lntf!:Hiatittnal ddft:terence on Mine Safety in Cavtat in 1979. I 
aPdldgl!e to thos~ Who have studied the papers of that Conference 
beeaus~ paris of tht!m will be repeated today. The problems, how-
ever; flgye nOt iost their relevance I the baSiC Situation haS 
~nnHtied unchanged, As an introduction, I would like to make a few 
co~nt~ dn ho~ mUltiple explosions can occur, and go into detail 
on the type of protection aimed at in the present work. 
Expiosidrt risks in mine fires 
Whert ah ~ ~ihe fire occurs; an explosion can generally be ex-
pee~ed td deveiopi The risk of an explosion occurring in the event 
of ~ rlbbeealed mine fire cannot be precluded from the outset, ei-
ther¥ ~h~ etpidsive medium may be a methane-air mixture, which 
cifi beedffi~ mare concentrated in the event of a fire. Gas continues 
to b~ emitted at more or less the same rate, at least at the ini-
tiai stage 8f th~ firij; whereas the ventilation is reduced, in 
sd~~ ~aaei draeticaiiy• as a result either of the fire itself or 
dt th~ step§ tlieh to extinguish it. An explosive mixture can also 
be creited when combustible gases form through a shortage of 
ot~gen in the fire itself, and are then diluted when they mix with 
fresh vehtilating air containing oxygen. Both methane and fume 
etpios!ohs cafi trigger dff a coal dust explosion. Since gas and 
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fume emission continue over a long period, it is definitely 
conceivable that the process by which an explosive mixture forms 
can recur several times in succession. The constant presence of 
an ignition source - the fire - means that there is a risk of 
several explosions occurring successively. Such multiple explo-
sions are frequently observed in fires; the interval between 
explosions depends on the ventilation conditions and ranges from 
several minutes to several hours or days. 
Protection by means of existing explosion barriers 
To begin with, it may be assumed that the mine rescue teams 
involved in firefighting are protected from this type of explosion 
by existing barriers. Mr Jenderek spoke about the barrier system 
used in the Federal Republic of Germany this morning and therefore 
I need not repeat that information. 
It can be estimated that about 10 complete barriers must be 
located in the air intake and return air roadways leading to a 
production district. The number of barriers is much higher, of 
course, if distance are very long. 
There should always be at least one of these barriers between 
the fire and the stopping-off point. 
Further measures in the event of fires 
Nevertheless, there are other means available for the suppression 
of explosions during stopping-off operations, such as the use of 
special 'rapid barriers'. These were developed several years ago 
at the Versuchsgrube Tremonia as lightweight barriers which can 
be installed by the mines rescue team with relatively little 
effort and time. This type of barrier provides effective protec-
tion against explosions, even with a small amount of water, 
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btoause manriding and transport operations no longer have to be 
taken into aeeount when it is installed in the roadway. As I 
shall mention later, this special design is not really necessary 
at all and cart be simplified considerably. In recent times, the 
neutr~lit~tion of fires with nitrogen has come into increasing use 
in the Federal Republic of Germany. Apart from dampening the fire, 
thie m~thod le a very rapid means of reducing the explosion risk 
subetarttiallYt or even eliminating it completely. 
tn spit~ of the fairly positive results provided by the latter 
po~sibility in particular, the German mining authorities consi-
dered it deeirable to examine what protection the existing explo-
sion b~rriers could provide against a secondary explosion after 
they h~d been actuatad in a primary explosion which they had 
sueceed~d in oontaining. Furthermore. it was considered desirable 
to setk ways of increasing the protection provided by normal water 
trough or stone dUst barriers against multiple explosions. 
1 shall indicate the test results in a moment, and to help you 
undtrstand these more clearly, I think it is necessary to give 
a brier description or the experimental conditions. 
At the Ve~IUehsgrube Tremonia, like all other research institutes 
de~1ing with test explosions. we normally try to produce each 
t~ploslon in conditions which can be reproduced as closely as 
poseibl,, As a r~eult. the explosion gallery has to be cleaned 
Aft~r l&eh t&~t as w~ll ae possible and. before the next is 
oar~ied out. eo~l dUst. in some cases mixed with stone dust, has 
to be oeAtt@rtd in precisely defined quantities and according to 
~peciflc procedures. This general method had to be dispensed 
with in the testb in•olving double explosions. 
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Since the taking of measurements at the various points in the 
explosion gallery network at the Versuchsgrube Tremonia and the 
transfer of the measurements to the measuring station has been 
fully electronic processes for several years, no manual activities 
or checking have to be carried out between explosions. The road-
ways are also protected from the mechanical effects of explosions 
so that in normal cases, i.e. during medium explosions, there is 
no likelihood of damage occurring which would make repair work 
necessary. 
Since explosions can only be carried out when there is no-one 
underground, the tests can only be conducted during afternoon 
shifts because the morning and evening shifts are devoted to other 
work. In order to start the ventilation and check the effects and 
progress of explosions, a mines rescue team has to travel through 
the gallery area after each explosion test. 
A decisive item in the planning of the tests was the interval 
between the explosions. An interval of 24 hours involved no re-
arrangements or problems because this was the normal interval 
between test explosions. In this case, it was only necessary to 
dispense with the normal cleaning of the roadway. 
Since an interval of 24 hours was much longer than those occur-
ring in practice, steps were taken to reduce the period substan-
tially. A new primer cartridge was installed by the mines rescue 
team during the normal inspection after~he explosion. The 
cartridge consisted of a charge of 2.5 kg of granulated black-
powder in a W mortar (a steel container with a W-shaped axial 
section) and 3 to 6 pressure cylinders placed next to the wall 
near the charge, from each of which 5 kg of coal dust was ejected 
1 s prior to ignition of the blackpowder. The time taken by the 
mine rescue service meant that explosions could be carried out at 
intervals of about two hours. 
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To reouee the interval between two explosions even further, 
special preparations had to be made. Since the roadway could no 
long~r be inspected between the two explosions, the main ventila-
tion ~urrent had to be maintained in the course of the explosions 
as well. This generally does not present any problems and pre-
viovs ~est series have shown that the course of an explosion does 
~ot depeftd Qn the ventilation in the explosion area. Since the 
press.re of the explosions could be felt in the entire Versuchs-
grube fremonia •ine area, the ventilation structures guiding the 
air cvr:tent bad to be made explosion-proof. Sufficient experience 
had als0 be,en pthered on this subject, too. 
A more eomple~ problem was that of protecting the primer cart-
~idge for the second explosion. which had to be placed and made 
live betore the first explosion, from the effects of the first 
explosion so tbat it remained fully intact for the second explo-
sion. This was relatively simple in the case of the steel cylin-
ders for ejecting the coal dust, since it was possible to fix 
them securely enough to the supports to withstand the pressure, 
which is not very strong at the source of the explosion in any 
case. The ignition cables, which had to withstand the effects of 
the flames from the first explosion, were more problematical. The 
solution consisted in providing them with silicone rubber insu-
lation. The most difficult problem appeared to be the securing 
of the actual primer cartridge. i.e. the blackpowder ignition 
charge. Fortunately, however, a blackpowder charge placed in the 
borehole of a steel mortar was found to withstand the flame from 
art explosion without damage, so that it could be used for ignition 
th~ second explosion. 
The in~erval between the two explosions now only depended on the 
flushing of the explosion gallery with the ventilation current. 
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This operation took about twenty minutes and the removal of the 
explosion fumes was monitored by CO and co2 measuring units, which 
were placed in the return airstream and transmitted their readings 
to the surface. 
It is not possible to provide any further details of the test 
series in this talk. The information I have already given you is, 
however, sufficient to give you an insight into the experimental 
problems surrounding the work. I shall now try to give you a clear 
summary of the results obtained so far. 
The first result is not connected with the barrier's extinguishing 
capacity but is nevertheless characteristically significant for 
multiple explosions. For single explosions in underground condi-
tions, a coal dust concentration of about 300 gfm3, irrespective 
of the type of stone dust selected for neutralization, has proved 
to be the optimum value for the development of an explosion. Since 
during the tests a second explosion had to be made possible, for 
which combustible material had to remain available, it was decided 
to scatter 500 g of coal dust per m3 of gallery area, mixed with 
200 g of stonedust. This quantity proved insufficient and the 
effect of the secondary explosion was hardly stronger than that of 
the primer cartridge. Only when the amount of coal dust scattered 
was increased to 700 gfm3 and a more powerful primer cartridge was 
used was the secondary explosion able to develop into a full pro-
gressive explosion. 
As far as the barriers effectiveness is concerned, it can generally 
be said that the neutralizing effect of all barriers against the 
secondary explosions was weaker, the more effectively they suppres-
sed the primary explosion. When the results are examined in detail, 
we find the following: 
stone-dust barriers and, in some tests, water trough barriers with 
specific additives to the water, occasionally failed to function 
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even during the primary explosions. The flames from these explosions 
then filleo a large section of the roadways and the combustible 
material was almost entirely consumed. Consequently, the secondary 
explosion w~s w~ak and flames were only short. When highly effective 
wa~er-trqygb barriers, and especially wide-action barriers were 
tested; the primary explosions were suppressed at the first groups 
of throughs. The flames were short and little combustible material 
was consumed; the secondary explosion was able to develop substan-
tially in the combustible material that remained and long flames 
were produced. An interesting point is that this result did not 
vary ~ccording to the different intervals between explosions men-
tioned at the beginning of my talk. 
Tn the attempt to find barriers which were more effective against 
secondary explosions, additives were put into the suppressant wa-
ter to begin with. These consisted of either a wetting agent to 
increase the water•s capacity to wet the coal dust and prevent it 
from circulating, or of a substitute for water in the form of a 
calcium chloride solution. The wetting additives had no effect. In 
the case of the standing water troughs, the use of a calcium chlo-
ride solution had a negative effect, as already mentioned, in that 
the barriers did not operate properly during the primary explosions. 
This is most probably the result of an increase in the density of 
the suppressant fluid, and consequently, an increase in the weight 
of the filled troughs. The suspended water troughs were not affec-
ted in this way, but the neutralizing effect of the secondary ex-
plosion was not increased either. Triggered barriers consisting of 
water troughs, whose content was ejected by explosives, were used 
hut were a.lso unsuccessful. The design of a triggered barrier 
employing suppressant dust which is blasted out of steel cylinders 
will be described in. the next paper given by Mr Faber. Unfortuna-
tely, it has not yet been possible to investigate this possibility 
in test explosions. 
Secon(lary explosions were suppressed successfully by water troughs 
placed ort the floor and filled by the mine rescue service in an 
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operation lasting only a few minutes. This positive result has 
already had repercussions in the West German coalmining inctustry 
in that during emergencies, water trough~ are placed on the floor 
instead of using the high-speed barriers already mentioner1, which 
consist of rather complicated suspended troughs. Nevertheless, 
this methoc1 cannot be consirlered satisfactory for protection from 
seconci.ary explosions because it involves the entry of the mine 
rescue team in the part of the mine where there is a risk of 
ex1)losions. 
Tests so far show, therefore, that it has not been possible to 
re~esign conventional barriers by simple and inexpensive me~ns 
to m~ke them effective in neutralizing a seconci.ary explosion. 
Apart from tests to be carried out with the Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke 
trigeererl barrier system in double explosions, intensive studies 
of other possibilittes are to be conducted in a current research 
project. Unfortnnately, l-towever, a suitable barrier system is 
expected t0 be rather more complicated and expensive than the 
explosion barriers employen so far. 
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Multiple Suppression System for Triggered Barriers 
M. Faber 
Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke 
1be probleas associated with multiple explosions and their causes 
have already been examined in detail by Dr Meerbach, and therefore 
this stl.ldy can b~ confined to a description of how such explosions 
can be s~ceessfully suppressed by a newly developed system. It is 
autOQUR.tically assumed that the mechanical components of the suppres-
sion syst~ used are designed to resist the stresses to be expected 
from explosions and remain intact. 
Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke's newly developed system for the suppression 
of multiple explosions is based on the BVS triggered barrier system 
which op•rates by rapid registration of the ultraviolet radiation 
froa flaaes with a detector and transmission of the signal to an 
e~luation unit; the latter causes suppressant to be released from 
containers (V • 12,3 1, filled with 8 kg suppressant powder under 
120 bars of pressure from nitrogen). 
The general mode of operation of this new suppression system is ex-
plained below by way of a highly simplified description of a dual 
suppression system equipped with two sensors which is already available. 
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The flames are detected in each sensor by two selective detection tubes 
which are sensitive only to ultraviolet radiation from naked flames and 
sparks from the wavelength range of 190 nml...A<250 nm and not to light 
from other sources such as sunlight, daylight or artificial lighting 
(e.g. miners' lamps). To provide a further guarantee that the sensor 
responds only to naked flames and not to individual sparks, the moni-
toring ranges of the two tubes are selected so that they do not over-
lap. The output impulses of each tube are transmitted to a meter which 
is connected to a threshold controller. When the set threshold is ex-
ceeded, an output impulse is emitted. In a time subtraction stage, the 
output impulses of the two tubes are checked for their timing and are 
AND-linked only in the event of a time correlation of fit ~0 ms. It 
is this link signal which constitutes the triggering (detection) im-
pulse of the individual sensor, causing the barrier to be actuated. 
The triggering impulses of the (two) connected sensors are transmitted 
to the evaluation unit and passed through an OR-link stage, to ensure 
that each sensor can actuate the barrier on its own. 
The first actuation after the triggered barrier is put into operation 
then passes through an amplification circuit to actuate Barrier 1. 
At the same time, a time stage is started. After an adjustable waiting 
period, which is currently set at approximately 30 s, a further trig-
gered impulse arriving from the OR-stage automatically passes through 
an AND-stage and amplification circuit to actuate Barrier 2. The 
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oil'ouit is also designed so that after triggering has oocured, the 
equipment automatically tests itself and any parts of the barrier 
Mhioh ~ have been damaged in spite of their mechanical protection 
axe gutoma~ically switched off. 
11 a ~tel'ltrtot- doe-s not function during the standby phase, which can be 
mended to· e 72 h with an emergency power battery, it is automati-
e8ll:9' switched off and the equipnrent continues to function with the 
O'i-.l!tel' sens&:r only- If the suppressant containers of Barrier 1 become 
i~~ati?e (e.g. as a result of a cable fracture), the quantity of 
sup'PJ'etssam which is put out of action is automatically made up from 
ihe ~trl :te-served. for Barrier 2. There is therefore alw~s enough 
suppressant available for the first suppression. The automatic switch-
oveT and ~he above-mentioned defects are of course displayed by 
:r~oie-eenirolled indicator and the equipment's readiness for operation 
i8 also signalled by an appropriate indicator. 
The electronic components, which have been developed from the latest 
techniques (C-MOS) arld are of modular design, have been perfected and 
Sd~ied to the problems concerned. With them, the dual suppression 
system can be erlended almost without restriction to form a general 
multiple suppression system. There is therefore no problem in using 
rt n~ber of sensors for detection and actuating m number of barriers 
with dttly ~ne evaluation unit. The regular self-monitoring of all 
codtpottents and automatic cyclic testing of the sensors keep the equip-
ment constantly ready for operation over its entire installed capacity 
range. Defective parts are automatically switched off and any reduction 
in capacity is made up by suppressant ''brought forward from the rear". 
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This report is therefore intended to illustrate how the mobile trig-
gered barrier system already presented by Dr Scholl is able, with 
controlled distribution of the total quantity of suppressant available 
(50 suppressant containers) and with this newly developed control 
unit, to provide more effective protection from double explosions, 
e.g. when the rescue service is carrying out stopping-off operations. 
". . 
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PREVENTION OF WEAK DUST EXPLOSIONS 
M. Giltaire and J. Winter 
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches des Charbonnages de France 
SUMMARY 
There is no need to stress the advisability of attemp~ng 
to prevent any local ignition of firedamp or dust from leading to 
the propagation of a dust explosion, and should this happen, try-
ing to halt the explosion as close as possible to its starting 
point. 
Neutralizing dust by stonedusting properly and on a 
permanent basis is quite often impossible in places where coal 
nust is likely to settle continually and in substantial quantities 
(e.g. in sections of roadways near faces). Wetting the dust may be 
considered in such cases to make neutralization more effective and 
tests are being carried out at present at the CERCHAR (Centre 
d'Etudes et de Recherches des Charbonnages de France) to evaluate 
the increased safety this may provide. 
It was observed, for instance, that in a gallery of 
approximately 10 m2 cross-section a dust deposit made up of a uni-
form mixture of 6 to 12 %water and fine coal dust with a natural 
ash content of 47 % did not propagate a dust explosion initiated 
by an explosive charge in a cloud of coal dust raised into the air. 
In the same gallery, with more dangerous coal (volatile 
matter index 23 %, ash content on a dry basis 6.4 %) and under the 
same conditions as before, a 12 %moisture content in the dust de-
posit may be considered as effective in preventing an explosion as 
a solid inert content of 50 %. 
Tests were undertaken in a metal surface gallery with a 
2.5 m2 cross section and 140 m long with coal of high volatile 
matter content, approaching 4o %, using an initiation source made 
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up of a cloud of 28 m3 of firedamp ignited by 300 g of black 
powder in a mortar. The tests were designed to discover the per-
centage of calcareous dust needed to prevent the propagation of 
explosions or various percentages of water added to coal calca-
reous dust mixtures. 
In a graph showing ~~Q percentage of solid inerts plus 
the percentage natural moisture of the coal along the x-axis, and 
the percentage of water added along the y-axis, the areas corres-
ponding to propagation and non-propagation of explosions are deli-
mited by a straight line whose slope is of the order of - 0.5. As 
a first approximation, with uniform mixtures of coal, calcareous 
dust and water such as these, a decrease of 2 % in the solid inerts 
may therefore be compensated by an increase of 1 % in the water. 
Another means of preventing of a dust explosion consists 
In installing water barriers, the value of which was demonstrated 
in particular during tests in the Tremonia experimental mine. 
Nevertheless, safety-barriers of any type are known to fail if the 
explosion is a weak one, furthermore, mining contraints mean that 
water troughs cannot always be set up in conditions of maximum 
effectiveness. 
Therefore, in order to reply to many questions from mine 
owners, and allow them to see the evidence with their own eyes, we 
felt it was worthwhile to test wide-action barriers in weak explo-
sions to demonstrate the relative importance to be given to recom-
mendations on installation. 
In these tests, which were carried out in a gallery of 
approximately 10 m2 cross-section, the wide-action water barriers 
were made up of four rows of one or two 80-litre troughs set 20 
metres apart and placed at 35, 55, 75 and 95 metres from the end 
of the gallery. The explosion flame travelled at a velocity of the 
order of 60 to 90 m/s in the safety barrier area. 
As a result of these tests, the following recommendations, 
in order of increasing importance, may be given in order to achieve 
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maximum effectiveness with wide-action water barriers: 
troughs which are inserted into the supporting framework are 
slightly more effective than troughs which are simply placed on 
the supports; 
troughs placed one behind an other in a line parallel with the 
roadway axis must be at least 1.2 m apart; 
troughs should not be placed behind props; 
troughs should not be placed against the roadway roof - at least 
if it is more than 2 to 3 m high - and they should not be placed 
on other troughs1 
trough frameworks or supports should be of such a design that 
troughs cannot be rocked or displaced before being broken up; 
troughs must have their broad sides at right angles to the road-
way axis. 
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PREVENTION OF WEAK DUST EXPLOSIONS 
M. Giltaire and J. Winter 
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches des Charbonnages de France 
The disaster which saddened the French mining industry 
in late 1974 obviously had direct repercussions on the industry's 
programme of research into dust explosions. 
This particular dust explosion drew attention to the 
difficulties encountered in monitoring the neutralization of a 
dust deposit, an even more complicated problem when the deposit is 
damp, and Mr Liberda has rightly mentioned the many questions 
which might be raised in this connection. 
It should also be pointed out that while the explosion 
unfortunately affected a very extensive area it can not be called 
a very violent one in view of its mechanical effects. 
Measures to eliminate accumulations of firedamp (and as 
a result the main cause of violent explosions) and to prevent dust 
from being raised into the air and burning mean that in practice, 
once a dust explosion starts, the probability of its being fairly 
weak is high, at least at its point of origin. 
An example of such a situation is provided by the sections 
of roadway near a face, where the build-up of dust may be substan-
tial but the lack of space due to the presence of workers and 
equipment means that the sections cannot be neutralized as fre-
quently and effectively as they should. Here, neutralization using 
water may perhaps be a worthwhile solution but we consider it im-
portant to look into its limitations. 
In such areas as well as in other mine workings, the same 
factors or natural conditions such as a narrow cross-section, a 
steep slope, etc. may also make it difficult to install safety 
barriers under optimum conditions ensuring maximum effectiveness. 
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Therefore, in order to reply to many questions from mine owners -
and allow them to see the evidence with their own eyes -we felt 
it was worthwhile to safety barriers in weak explosions to show 
up the relative value to be given to some recommendations on the 
installation of safety barriers, especially wide-action water 
barriers. 
A - THE USE OF WATER TO NEUTRALIZE DUST DEPOSITS WITH AN INSUFFI-
CIENT STONEDUST RATIO. 
The research carried out by Cybulski showed that dust 
explosions did not spread when a sufficient quantity of water was 
added to mixtures of coal and calcareous dust. He discovered that 
the relationship between total water content and solid inerts con-
tents which allows the areas of propagation and non-propagation to 
be delimited depended greatly on the violence of the source of 
ignition. 
The tests described by Cybulski were carried out with 
coal with a high volatile matter content and a substantial amount 
of absorbed water (about 10 %}. It therefore seemed worthwhile to 
assess the effect of the moisture with coal of varying characte-
ristics. 
After some tests in a gallery with a large cross-section 
(in our Montlaville quarry), we undertook more systematic tests in 
our 2.5 m2 cross-section metal gallery. 
1. Tests in the Montlaville gallery with coal dust only. 
1.1.1. Gallery. 
= = = = 
The Montlaville gallery is 145 m long. The cross-section 
is trapezoidal and varies between 8 and 12m2• The roof is bolted. 
- l~-
1.1.2. Source of ignition. 
- - - -
- - = = 
Tests were carried out with an ignition· source which may 
be described as moderately violent. This was 8 kg Montrambert coal 
dust placed in a pile at the end of the gallery, raised into the 
air by 10 g of explosive and ignited by 300 g rock explosive. 
Furthermore, 4 cross supports were placed between 5 and 10 m from 
the end and each bore 8 kg of Montrambert coaldust. 
1.1.3. Dust deposit. 
= = = = = = = 
The deposit extended from 5 to 120 m from the end of the 
gallery. It was spread in such a way as to give an average concen-
tration of 300 to 400 g/m3 assuming that all the dust was raised 
into the air and spread uniformly around the roadway during the 
explosion. 
The dust was deposited either only on the floor, or part-
ly on the floor and partly on 11 boards balanced across the gallery 
2 rn high and at regular distances between 20 and 120 m. Each plank 
bore 8 kg of dust and was intended to help produce a cloud of dust 
throughout the gallery cross-section. 
For these tests, two types of coal were useds 
coal from the Six Sillons seam, Lens (volatile matter index on 
a d.a.f. basis: 27.5 %; ash in dry state: 46.8 %; 60% passing 
through a sieve with a 80 pro mesh); 
coal from Montrambert (volatile matter index on a d.a.f. basis: 
22.9 %J ash in dry state 8.4 %J 60 % passing trough a sieve 
with a 80 llrrl mesh). 
Immediately before it was placed in the floor or the 
supports, the dust was wetted in a totating cement mixer containing 
40 to 50 kg coal and water mixture. 
Samples were taken at four points in the gallery to 
measure the moisture content after the dust was deposited. 
- 143 -
1.2. Results of tests. 
- - - - - - - - -
1.2.1. Lens Coal (46.8 % inerts in dry state) 
- - -
- -
With dry dust placed on the floor and boards, the flame 
once extended outside the gallery (test 860) and once as far as 110 
metres (test 863). The explosion spread at fairly low speeds, of 
the order of 50 mfs. The maximum explosion pressures 5 metres from 
the end were of the order of 0.22 bar ('static' pressures). 
Once the moisture content of the dust deposit was in-
creased to 6, 10 or 12 %, the explosion of the ignition source no 
longer propagated a dust explosion: see Fig. 1. 
1.2.2. Montrambert coal (8.4 % inerts in dry state) 
= = = = = = = = = 
With dust only on the floor and a moisture content of 
12 %, the flame proceeds at a speed which falls quickly once the 
effect of the ignition source ceases, between 35 and 60 metres. 
This may be seen in Figure 2 on comparing tests number 820 and 838 
without moisture and test number 896 with 12 %moisture content. 
Here the explosion pressure 5 metres from the end was about 0.3 
bars. 
With dry dust deposited both on the floor and on boards, 
flame velocities are already higher than 100 m/s between 35 and 60 
m (test 861, Figure 2) and the pressure is about 0.5 bar. 
However, with a 12% moisture content a very slight in-
crease in the flame velocity beyond 35 metres (test 893) was obser-
ved and with a 15 % moisture content the flame velocity falls 
after 35m (test 891). The 12% moisture content is no doubt close 
to the maximum percentage giving a propagation probability of 50 % 
under our test conditions. 
In this series of test, pressures were observed to be 
distinctly lower when the deposit was wet than when it was dry. 
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With the same source of ignition but using calcareous 
dust rather than water to neutralize the Montrambert coaldust, we 
worked out the 'maximum neutralization ratio• for a 50 % probabili-
ty of an explosion reaching the end of the gallery. 
With dust on the floor only, the series of tests gave a 
maximum inert content of 46.1 %. However, this maximum content was 
found to be equal to 54 % when dust was deposited both on the floor 
and on boards. 
A comparison of moisture or solid inerts necessary to 
bring down the risk explosion propagation in our Montlaville galle-
ry therefore shows that a relatively small quantity of water 
about 12 % - is required to prevent the dust transmitting an igni-
tion, whereas a solid inert content of about 50 % is required to 
achieve the same results. 
Water is therefore particularly effective when the source 
of ignition for the dust explosion is relatively weak. 
2. Tests in a surface gallery with mixtures of coal, 
calcareous dust and water. 
2.1.1. Gallery. 
- - = = 
The metal gallery, a diagram of which is given in Figure 
3, is 1.8 m in diameter and 142.5 m long. The inner wall is smooth. 
A concrete floor brings the cross section down to 2.47 m2 and 
forms a horizontal surface 0.8 m wide on which the dust is spread. 
2.1.2. Source of ignition. 
= = = = = = = = = = 
This was a firedamp pocket 10.5 m long and 28 m2 in 
volume. The mixture containing approximately 9 % methane was igni-
teo by firing 300 grams black powder in a mortar placed outside 
the gallery. 
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The fla.me from such a source of ignition generally 
spreads up to about 80 m from the end of the gallery. The average 
velocities of the flame produced were about 150 mjs between 0 and 
18 m and fell to 60 mjs between 60 and 72 metres from the end. The 
degree of violence of this source of ignition may therefore be 
considered moderate. Pressure at 24 metres was about 1.9 bar. 
2.1.3. Dust. 
= = = 
The dust deposits were prepared using coal from La Houve 
and Merlebach with the following average characteristics. 
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Coal Moisture content Volatile matter Inert ratio of 
of the air-dried index of the dry coal 
coal d.a.f. 
!========== ~================= F================ ~================= 
La Houve 4.5 4o.o 11.6 
Merle bach 2.4 39.6 6.3 
The dust was crushed for periods of time so that 75 % 
of it passed through a sieve with an 80)Wll mesh. 
As in the previous tests, the dust was wetted just be-
fore being deposited on the floor and a cement mixer was used to 
produce the mixes. 
2.1.4. Evaluating the critical inert ratio. 
= = = = = = = = = = = = - - - -- - - -
Experiments were carried out using various percentages 
of water added to the coal and calcareous dust mixtures to find 
the critical inert ratios defined as the mean of: 
the highest figure for the inert ratio {ash+ calcareous dust+ 
adsorbed water) giving two explosions extending throughout the 
gallery, 
and the figure immediately above for the inert ratio, differing 
from the first by at least five points, which resulted in two 
failures to propagate an explosion. 
This definition should allow the inert ratio correspon-
ding to a propagation probability equal to 0.5 with an accuracy of 
about 2.5 %. 
The tests carried out using Merlebach and La Houve coal 
gave the results in Figure 4. 
- 150 -
The areas of propagation and non-propagation of the ex-
plosions are delimited by a straight line with a slope of appro-
ximately - o.5. 
As a first approximation, a decrease of 2 % in solid 
inert content may therefore be offset by an increase of 1 % in 
moisture content. 
In the test conoitions chosen, with a moderately violent 
source of ignition, an examination of the regression line plotted 
shows that with an ash content of zero, approximately 37 parts of 
water could be needed for 63 parts of coal (i.e. 0.58 parts water 
for 1 part of pure coal) to give a propagation probability of 50 %. 
Under the same conditions, the same result would be achieved with 
68 % inerts and 32 % dry ash free coal, i.e. 2.1 parts inert for 
1 part of d.a.f. coal. It may therefore be estimated that one litre 
of water is as effective as 2.1/0.58 # r 3.5 kg stonedust. 
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This is all more significant as water is always availa-
ble near workings and may be used at all times to wash the walls 
or wet dust on the floor whereas stonedusting cannot be undertaken 
without evacuating the staff downwind of the area to be treated. 
Nevertheless, it should not be forgother that these 
results were obtained with perfectly mixed mixtures of coal, cal-
careous dust and water. 
B - EFFECTIVENESS OF WIDE-ACTION WATER BARRIERS INSTALLED NEAR THE 
IGNITION POINT OF A DUST EXPLOSION 
For a water safety-barrier to be effective it is known 
that the rush of air preceding the flame must break up the troughs 
and produce a sufficiently big cloud of water droplets. 
In view of the fact that water troughs often cannot be 
set up in roadway sections overcrowded by equipment and staff 
working in them, the best use possible should be made of those 
located near such critical zones to provide effective prevention 
against any explosion occurring there. Unfortunately, it is not 
always possible in practice to install troughs under the conditions 
which are theoretically the best. 
Some findings of tests carried out with a moderately 
violent source of explosion are given here. These tests made it 
possible to evaluate the relative importance of recommendations 
regarding the installation of water troughs and especially those 
of wide-action barriers. 
1. Test conditions. 
The tests were carried out in our Montlaville gallery 
briefly described above. 
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1.2. Source of ignition. 
- - - - - - - - - -
We initiated the explosions with the ignition source 
described in paragraph A 1.1.2. (firing of an explosive charge to 
set off a cloud of raised dust). 
Most of the tests were carried out with Montrambert coal 
dust deposited solely on the floor. Nevertheless, for some tests 
the dust was partly placed on 11 balanced boards and partly on the 
roadway floor. 
The wide-action barrier was made up of four rows of So-
litre troughs placed 20 metres apart and located 35, 55, 75 and 95 
metres from the end of the gallery so that the water concentration 
calculated with respect to the gallery volume was approximately 
0.5 or 1 litre per cubic metre depending on whether there were one 
or two troughs per row. 
The troughs used were made either of PVC or of expanded 
polystyrene. Their broad sides were placed across the roadway or 
along it. Figure 5 shows some of the ways in which troughs were 
placed for the tests. 
2. Findings from tests. 
Test findings have been grouped together in table form. 
Table I shows that for moderately violent explosions, 
there is no great difference between the effectiveness of troughs 
placed on and those inserbed into supports, nor between troughs in 
PVC or in expanded polystyrene. Furthermore, expanded polystyrene 
troughs the bottoms of which were held in a framework fixed firmly 
to the walls gave results which were as good as those for troughs 
slipped into supports and held by their rims. 
Table II highlights the importance of fixing troughs: 
when they are hung from vertical chains and may swing their effec-
tiveness is lower. This aspect was confirmed by tests under simi-
lar conditions to those in Table I but in which the trough supports 
were not fixed rigidly to the walls. 
The tests given in Table III show that it is important 
to leave a free space above the covers. Part of the water must be 
expelled for the trough to break and for its contents to be spread 
properly. 
Troughs may need to be moved further towards one wall of 
the roadway to leave room for a passage or they may need to be 
placed on the floor, either to safeguard the space under a belt-
conveyor or because a barrier must be set up very quickly - to 
protect rescue teams for example. 
The tests in Table IV were carried out with troughs 
placed lengthwise across the roadway. The results showed that a 
trough which is set nearer one wall may protect a width of roadway 
of the order of three metres when it is unrestricted and installed 
under good conditions (i.e. with broad side across the roadway 
axis and fixed firmly). Even troughs placed lengthwise across the 
roadway axis at floor level are effective to some extent. 
Table V gives the tests conducted in a roadway with a 
row of props one to two metres apart. It may be observed that 
troughs set up in one of the tracks formed by the props may be 
fairly effective and it is much better to set them up this way 
than between two props. It should be pointed out that during these 
tests some difference between troughs inserted into and those 
placed on supports was observed. Placing troughs on the supporting 
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group ot· troughs placed lengthwise across 
the roadway 
group of troughs placed lengthwise along 
the roadway 
trough placed against the roof 
trough between props 
trough placed lengthwise along the 
roadway axis 
trough hanging from vertical chains 
Fig. 5 - TESTS ON WATER TROUGHS 
Litres of Distance in metres coverec 
water per Number by flame (m) Dust deposit Position of troughs cubic of 
metre tests tiighest and 11m3 owest values Average 
troughs B 5 60-65 64 Floor inserted into 1 supports 
Lengthwise troughs placed B 1 2 60-75 67 across the on supports gallery 
troughs inserted EJ 
into supports 0~5 3 65-95 80 
Expanded polysty-~ 
rene troughs inser 0,5 2 95-110 103 ted into framewor 
and held by rims 
EPS troughs with B 
bottoms inserted 0,5 2 95 95 
into framework 
troughs inserted B 1 4 60-75 63 into framework 
Floor + 
boards 
troughs placed B on framework 1 4 60-90 77 
Table I-
Distance in metres covered 
Number lby flame (m) 
Position of troughs of highest and tests average lowest values 
- Troughs placed at right angles 
to the gallery 
Frameworks fixed solidly B - troughs inserted into framework to walls 4 65-110 87 
-
dust deposit on floor 
framework + chains EJ taut chains set at a - litres of water per cubic metre: slant 3 65-95 80 0.5 
framework + EJ vertically hung chains 1 110 110 
Table [[_ 
litres of Distance in metres coverec 
water per number by the fl~e 
Position of troughs cubic of 
m) 
m(timJ) tests [h.ighest and 
-
Troughs placed at right angles lowest values 
average 
to the gallery -
0,7to 1,2m lfd\ 0,5 3 - Troughs inserted into the 65-95 80 supporting framework 
-
- Dust deposit on the floor 0,4 m 1 1\. I \ /w 0,5 3 75-95 85 
covers against the 0 0,5 2 110- > 145 >127 
roof 
1 1 130 
0.7to 1.2m ~ Wooden covers bol- as ted to supporting 1 115 
framework 
B 0,5 2 65-82 73 
Two troughs one ~ above the other 1 1 67 
Table IIl. _ 
Litres of Distance in metres 
water per Number covered by~~~e 
Dust deposit Position of troughs cubic of 
metre tests !Highest and 
11m3 lowest values Average 
a 1 2 65 65 Floor 
-D 1 1 65 Lengthwise 
across the 
gallery E3 1 1 65 Floor + boards 
D 1 1 65 
B as 4 65-110 87 Floor 
' 0 0.5 2 97-110 103 
Floor + B boards 0.5 1 > 145 
T!!-ble N _ 
Litres of Distance in metres 
water per Number covered by(~~e 
Position of troughs cubic of 
metre tests !Highest and 
- Troughs placed at right //mJ lowest values Average 
angles to the gallery ffi - Dust deposit on the floor 0,5 3 65 65 
Troughs inserted 03 into supporting 0.5 2 67-82 75 framework 
Troughs placed on a supporting as 2 130- >145 >137 framework 
1 trough every ~ 20 m a.s 4 75->145 > 110 
1 trough every ~ 10 m 1 1 97 
a 1 1 97 
rn 1 1 97 
Table Y _ 
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framework produces appreciably less satisfactory results than 
slipping them into it when the troughs are in the narrowest track. 
The tests in Table VI highlight the importance of proper-
ly separating troughs set one behind the other and of placing them 
lengthwise across the roadway axis. If the effects of poor insta-
lation conditions, such as placing troughs both lengthwise along 
the roadway axis and very close to each other, are combined, sim-
ply increasing the quantity of water does not lead to any greater 
effectiveness of the barrier. 
As a result of these tests on wide-action water barriers 
carried out with moderately violent explosions (flame velocity of 
the order of 60 to 90 mjs in the barrier area) the following 
recommendations for achieving maximum effectiveness in order of 
increasing importance may be givena 
troughs which are inserted into supports are slightly more effec-
tive than troughs which are simply placed on the supports, 
troughs placed one behind an other in a line parallel with the 
roadway axis should be at least 1.2 m aparta 
troughs should not be placed behind propsa 
troughs should not be placed against the roadway roof - at least 
if it is more than 2-3 metres high - and they should not be pla-
ced on other troughsa 
trough frameworks or supports should be of such a design that 
troughs cannot be rocked or displaced before being broken up, 
troughs must have their broad sides at right angles to the road-
way axis. 
Dust deposit 
Floor 
Position of troughs 
Lengthwise 
across the 
gallery 
Lengthwise 
along the 
gallery axis 
fd\ 
\ A I --- t;:::{\ 
2 0.6~-- c:___j 
-- \1\ I ---E!J 
'"1 f 1,2m 
-- ---
'LfJ --- r:;;T\ 
--- c_j \ II r-- j'EI\ 
-- ---
10m 
Table ~ _ 
Litres of 
water per 
cubic 
metre ffmJ 
1 
1 
0,5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Number 
of 
tests 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
Distance in metres 
covered by {A?~e 
Highest and 
lowest value! 
65-95 
67-97 
65 
140 
110 
>14-5 
132-140 
105-115 
97-105 
Average 
80 
82 
65 
140 
136 
110 
101 
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New operational developments in the use of dust-binding in the 
Federal ijepublic of Germany 
1. Introduction 
In the West German coal mining industry hygroscopic salts are used to 
consolidate potentially explosive coal dust. These salts (calcium chloride 
ruld magnesium chloride are in common use) mB\Y be applied in the form of paste, 
powder, flakes or as an aqueous solution to the floors and other surfaces of 
road'WS\YS• In view of the importance of this technique, the Mines Safety and 
Health Commission, acting on a proposal from the Working Party on Flammable 
Dusts, issued a recommendation on dust-binding by hygroscopic salts in 
1976 (Doc. 735/76). 
As the techniques which were then available tor duat-birldi:ag operations have 
since been further develQped, some details ~ bs ot interest. Like other 
methods of protection against explosions (e.g. atone dusting) dust-binding 
requires a certain amount of labour, mB\Y impede the conduct of operations 
and involves the use of haulage media. The purpose of further development 
was and is to reduce the effect of these factors. 
2. Application of salt paste 
Shortly after the introduction of dust-binding agents in paste form, an 
attempt was made to improve efficiency by ~roviding central pumping 
stations. Initially, only individual panels or a single working level 
were centrally supplied, the paste being delivered in converted mine 
cars or in trucks with a pressure tank. 
The present trend is towards supplying an entire colliery from the surface 
via shaft and roadw~ pipe ranges (Figure 1). Eight collieries in the 
West German coal mining industry are currently equipped with central 
supply installations and others are preparing-to introduce such 
systems. 
The surface supply stations consist of a number of silos and pumps for 
delivery of the material to the shafts. They are installed at shafts 
which are suitably located in relation to the working area be!ow groaDd 
(Figure 2). 
The paste is delivered to the working levels through high-pressure pipe 
ranges between 40 and 8o mm in diameter. 25 mm pipes are generally 
installeQ. in level roadwqa. As a result of the statio pressure 
developed in the shaft range, it is possible to supply deliver;r 
points at distances of up to 1500 m without the use of pumps. POr 
more distant workings, automatically controlled high-pressure pwaps 
with a working pressure of ~ bars are used. With nch 1171R•s U 
has so far been po•sible to apply p&rie over a diri&DOe of up to 
5·5 laa {!Pipre 3). 
Capital costs for a medium-sized colliery amount to DM 500 000 to 
700 000. They ~' however, be recovered in as little as 2 years 
through savings of labour and material. 
Such measures make it possible to dispense with the labour required 
for mine car and container transport and for pump operation. This 
amounts to a saving of at least 5 shifts per day while simultaneously 
improving performance. 
The paste compositions are currently standardized at a salt concentration 
of 28 % for calcium chloride and 
20% for magnesium chloride. 
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As the depth of working and consequently the mine temperatures increase, 
there may be a drop in relative humidity. In such cases the standard paste 
may dry out before it is exhausted. It is then desirable to increase the 
.salt content to the point of saturation, i.e. not more than 33%, at which 
concentration it is in equilibrium when the relative humidity is 55%• 
While this makes the paste somewhat more expensive, increases of up to 
80% have been achieved in its service life. 
3. Application of calcium chloride powder 
When powder is used, the method normally employed is still to lay out bags 
of :P kg capacity in the road~s to be treated. The powder is aspira.ted 
from the bag with a compressed-air-operated ejector and blown over the 
roadway periphery by means of a discharge hose. For a long time, no further 
development of the technique took place, with the result that it seemed 
likely to decline in importance because of the fairly high labour require-
ments as compared with the use of paste and because of the nuisance to 
which it gave rise. 
It has recently become possible to deliver Ca.Cl2 powder in large packs of 
800 kg and over (Figure 4). The salt powder is loaded directly from these 
packs into large containers specially designed for transport below ground 
(Figure 5). These containers are transported by means of floor-mouted rail 
systems or overhead monorails to the point of application, where the powder 
is aspirated through apertures in the sides of the containers and blown 
over the surfaces to be treated. Such containers are currently produoed by 
the firm MUller & Borggrafe. They cost DM 5 000 to 6 000. 
In order to improve the discharge rates, one colliery converted existing 
Rheinelbe pressure vessels which were previously used to deliver dry 
stone dust or materials for pack construction (Figure 6). 
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There is certainly scope for further development of the technique by 
improved methods of transport to the point of use. 
The new containers have oermi tted an increase in performance, ranging 
from 30 to 70% according to circumstances of use, together with 
saving in labour costs. 
As in the past, a disadvantage of the use of powder remains the dust 
nuisance, which is undesirable, although not a hazard for the workers. 
Powder spreading is therefore usually carried out during the shift when 
least other work is in progress, i.e. often at the weekend. 
In some collieries, a calcium chloride powder dispenser, as illustrated 
in Figure 7, is used for dust control at belt conveyor transfer points. 
The device consists of a small container filled with calcium chloride 
powder, which is suspended at the transfer point. The discharge port at 
the bottom of the device is filled with a cover held in place by elastic. 
The cover is caused to vibrate by compressed air and continually allows 
small quantities of powder to escape. The powder mixes with the coal 
dust dispersed at the transfer point and is also deposited on the conveyed 
mineral. 
4· A~plication of calcium chloride solution 
As a remedy for the above disadvantages of powder spreading, it was 
necessary to have recourse to a technique previously employed, viz the 
production of salt solutions. A 30% calcium chloride solution was mixed 
in containers or delivered ready-mixed. The salt solution was pumped 
into a supply line consisting of 25 mm pipes or 19 mm hoses. At the places 
of application, the solution is sprayed on the roadway periphery with 
the aid of a spray pipe (Figure 8). A spraying car was developed for use 
' . 
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in fairly long roadways with rail track (Figure 9). 
A low-pressure reciprocating pump forces the calcium chloride solution, 
which is produced in the car, through discharge nozzles which are 
arranged in a circular configuration with individual feed. It is thus 
possible to work selectively and to avoid spraying roadway installations 
which are liable to suffer damage. 
This technique permits high levels of performance, though the spraying 
process must be repeated more frequently than is the case for the other 
dust-binding techniques. No reliable indication can as yet be given of 
its cost-effectiveness. 
5. Treatment with calcium chloride flakes 
Calcium chloride flakes are particularly suitable for dust consolidation 
on the roadway floor. Salting cars similar to those used for road salting 
have been developed and used for this purpose. As yet the method still 
suffers from the disadvantage that the distributing plate which serves 
to discharge the salt is placed fairly high with the result that 
the flakes do not reach the floor below the bottom strands of low belt 
conveyors. Here, too, further development will lead to improvements 
(Figure 10). 
6. Conclusion 
New operational developments in the use of dust-binding offer the following 
advantages: 
- better, sometimes constant, availability; 
- increased performance and reduced labour requirements; 
- lowering of operating costs; 
- less interference with mining operations as a result of the provision of 
separate transport systems (e.g. pipe ranges). 
Improved availability is of particular importance for purposes of protection 
against explosions. 
Illustrations for the paper 
"New operational developments in the use of dust-binding in the Federal 
Republic of Germany" 
Figure 1: ~out of a central paste supply system 
Figure 2: Paste supply installation above ground 
Figure 3: Automated central pumping station below ground 
Figure 4: La.rge-capaci ty pack for calcium chloride powder 
Figure 5: La.rge-capaci ty container for the uae ot calcium 
chloride powder below ground 
Figure 6: Use of a Rheinelbe pressure vessel for calcium 
chloride powder 
Figure 7: Vibratory dispenser for calcium chloride powder 
Figure 8: Spr~ pipe for salt solution 
Figu.re 9: "Minister Achenbach" spr~ing car 
Figure 10 : Floor-salting car 
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Abhjldungen zum Referat 
"Neue bctricbliche Lntwicklungen bei Jer Anwendung der Staub-
bindcvcrfahren in Jer BunJesrcpublik Dcutschl<md" (M. Schnier) 
BilJ 1 
Bild 2: 
--'i!Ht.UilltflUMG 
Layout of a central paste supply system 
.-1 Schema J'un systemc J'approvisionnement central en pates 
Schema cincr :entralcn Pastenversorgung 
Paste supply installation above ground 
.... Installation d'approvisionncment en pates au jour 
Pastenversorgungsanlage Liber Tage 
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Bild 3: Automated central pumping station below ground 
Station centrale automatisee de pompage au fond 
Automatisierte Zcntralpumpstation unter Tage 
Bild 4: Large capacity pack for calcium chloride powder 
R6cipient de grande capacit~ pour le transport 
de la pouJre de chlorure de calcium 
Grof?Jgehtnde fUr Calciumchlorid-Pulver 
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Bild 5: Large-capacity contJiner for the use of calcium 
chloride powder hclow ground 
Conteneur de grande capacit~ pour 1' utilisation au fond 
de la pouJrc de chlorure de calcium 
GroGbeki l tc r flir d i c Untertageverwendung von Calcium-
c h 1 o r i d- !' u l v c 1· 
Bi 1 d 6: Use of a Rhc i DL' l be pressure vcs scl for calcium 
c lori de po1vJe r 
Utilis<Hion d'un apparcil a injection "Rheinelbe" 
pour 1'0panJage pncumatiquc Je la poudre de chlorure 
de calcium 
\'erwendung cines I<hcinclbc-Kessels fur Calciumchlorid-
Pulvcr 
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Bild 7: Vibratory Ji~pense1 for calcium chloride powder 
Apparci1 vibrateur pOU!' la poudre ue chlorure 
de calcium 
\'ihration~;ger~it fiir CalciumchJorid-Pulvcr 
Bild 8: Spray pipe for salt ~olution 
Canne pour la uispcrsion Jc la solution saline 
DUsenstab flir <..;al;:lhsung 
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Bild 9: "Minister Achenbach" spraying car 
B:i ld 10: 
Wagon du type "Minister Achenbach" pour pulverisations 
Sp ruhwagen Sys tern ''Minister Achenbach 
Floor-saltiug car 
Wagon cpanJcur pour la sole 
Soh1 en-Strcu\vagcn 
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FUT2RE O~ECTIVES IN ARRESTING EXPLOSIONS Ainsworth 
During recent years methods of extraction have witnessed radical changes as 
the burden of high capital cost of equipment and other economic factors have 
increased rapidly in a period of high inflation demanding an increased ret,~ 
on inv~stment. The effects of these influences has resulted in production 
being obtained from fewer faces, with a marked increase in HP to achieve 
higher levels of output. Changes in machine performance and improvements 
ln support design have encouraged full seam extraction. 
Unfortunately there is a resultant tendency of ignitions due to frictional 
sparking oaused by rotating picks making contact with quartzic material in 
either the roof or the floor. 
On average 17 ienitions occur each year in UK mines fortunately all of a 
minor nature and of this number an average of 15 are due to frictional 
sparking during the operation of cutting or power loading machines. The 
re(luced severity of the ignitions can be attributed to a combination of 
good ventilationt the generally adopted practice of methane drainage, 
making cutting machines more responsive to horizon control by fi t·ting 
sensing devices and the adoption of hollow shaft v~ntilation to dilnte 
methane in the cutting area. 
As powered supports dictate the cross sectional appearance of a face 
it should be appreciated that fundamental changes in the design of supports 
may have a profound bearing on potential ignitions. For example shield 
supports which are being introduced in increasing numbers produce a profile 
of tube-like proportions. The migration of methane from the goaf on faces 
equipped with shield supports and the effect of any restrictj rm :for cxatnple in 
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the machine area and its influence on an ignition are matters calling 
for closer examination. Protection against explosions may eventually 
be considered necessary on longwall faces as well as in roadways. As 
containment of an ignition to prevent spread is of primary importance, 
mea.Tls of extinguishing may require to be in close proximity to the point 
of origin. Thus on faces equipped with shield supports and perhaps other 
types of powered supports release of water or other non-hazardous 
extinguishing material carried on the supports or indeed on machines could 
provide a distributive quenching arrangement on the detection of a sudden 
temperature rise. The rate of release of the quenchir~ material in the 
confined profile of a longwall face should be such that injury to workmen 
in the vicinity would not occur. 
Barrier protection in UK mines is confined to roadways where coal is conveyed 
and in most mines this generally means Intake roadways. During recent years 
ignitions have tended to take place between the mid point and return end of 
long',.rall faces. The implications of this trend are given further emphasis 
by the deposition of coal dust in return airways as a consequence of higher 
rates of extraction and larger quanti ties of air traversing faces at increast.!d 
velocities, which can to come degree be counteracted by the adoption of effective 
dust suppression meacures and systematic cleaning up and stone dusting. The 
time JTlay be approaching when a departlLTe should be made from existing practice 
which was after all devised when machine cut hand filling was customary and 
consider the adoption of barrier protection in all roadways leading to a 
production unit. Thus providing a means of isolation from other production areas. 
Barrier protection consists of whole or part width stone dust barriers now 
l>eing augmented by Triggered Barriers as an alternative to stone dust barriers 
sited near to the anticipated iG~ition. Water trough barriers have been used 
in a few isolated cases but have not foun•l favour for requirements. Experience 
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with Triggered Barriers has shown that handling problems can arise in 
certain conditions, which would seem to suggest that a move towards 
smaller d~spereer units for manoeuvrability in roadways under 2m in 
. 
height might be given consideration. 
The positi..Ofli.ng of stone dust barriers sited nea.r to the anticipated ignition 
is most ~portant, but with the rapid rates of advance now being achieved 
on adv~c~qg and retreating faces, frequency of movement of barriers becomes 
important; the less frequently the better. It is essential that production 
is not ~1!.ndered whilst tit the same time a. barrier protection is provided 
continuou~ly. A distributive barrier system achieves both these objectives. 
'l'J.·,e selection of any barrier system should therefore be determined with these 
aspP.c.ts in mind. 
~1c emphasis on barrier protection has been up to the present time towards 
protection against coal dust explosions. In view of the frequency of methane 
ignitlom the deteetion of sudden temperature and other variations in the 
vet~ early stages of development is most important in initiating protective 
measures. The existance of miniaturised electronic equipment may have a 
contribution to make in this direction. 
In view of the constantly changing methods of mining techniques it is 
becomir~ increasingly difficult to carry out research under simulated 
conditions. In o~der to provide management with a catalogue of possible 
projections and variations greater emphasis may have to be given to the 
acceptance of eQmputer analysis. 
Whilst due recognition has been given to Cybulski's approach to barriP.r 
protection in conventional mining operations, it has been appreciated in the 
UK. that because of sophisticated changes in mini.ng environments a sophisticated 
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approach must be adopted in dealing with potential explosions. It 
is hoped that the contents of this paper indicate the direction on 
wtich progress ~eeds to be made. 
18 March 1981 
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SYKPOSIUM ON i::XPLOSIONS AND TRIGGERED BA;{lUERS 
LU~ilV!BOURG, 5TH NOVl'J.lBER 1981 
Ope:ra,t.?~!\1001 ,~t;:l(perience with Triggered Barriers within the U.K. 
by J. L. Collinson and R. T. Pye 
INTRODUCTION 
In ~~diti~n to the basie meth~d of general stone dusting to arrest underground 
e~pl~si~s practised far a long time, U.K. mines have for more than 25 years 
~sed types of stone dust barriers on coal conveyor roads associated with the 
coal face. These have been light, intermediate and heavy type stonedust 
barriers. ~'rly in the 1970's there was an increase in retreat mining in in-
seam condition& necessitating lower and square roadways and it was found that 
the mant shelves of a light stone dust barrier were not easy to maintain or 
advance. In view of this changed mining technology research and development was 
initiated to design a replacement for the light stone dust barrier and eventually 
the flame triggered water barrier was conceived, developed and tested. 
uuring the development star:e operational trials were carried out undP.rground with 
the equipment in an unarmed condition basically to a.ssess handleability and 
thereafter armed trials were conducted. Its safety if water dischar; ;e occurred 
on to a man was tested in animal trials. 
During the development, gallery trials had been conducted and this produced some 
limitations in that tests could only be carried out in galleries up to 7m2 and 
with distances between the dispersers and the side of the roadway of up to 2m. 
Gubsequently approvals were granted by the U.K. Mining Inspectorate to proceed 
operationall7 with triggered water barriers as acceptable alternatives to light 
ston~ dust bai'riers in U.I~. coal mines. 
By early l9Bl two installations had been in full operation in the U.K. This 
pAper describes operational experience so far and includes elements of training, 
handling, fault experience and maintenance. 
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PR8 IN~;TALLATION 
~·~xperience has shown the necessity to conduct comprehensive training of 
individuals both officials, workmen and craftsmen who would be involved 
with the trig1·ered barriers and it has also shown that the actual suspension 
and handling of the triggered barriers during transport and on site had to 
be given considerable attention in addition to just the design of the barrier 
itself. 
For training before the installation took place, personnel were selected and 
the trainint; conducted at a Board workshop. This introduced all personnel to 
the new system, enabled those who had to handle the equipment to have practice 
in so doing, enabled craftsmen to be acquainted with the regular routine 
maintenance that would be required by them and enabled officials on whose 
districts barriers would be installed to be familiar with the whole working 
of them and the daily examinations which they themselves would have to 
conduct • .C.:ach man involved had a one day's training. 
Prior to installation underground the barriers were erected in a simulated 
roadway and various experiments carried out to determine the best way of 
handling and advancing these units. 
HlSTALLI~D EXP!i:.RHJ'lCJ.<; 
Gareful attention was given to the selection of sites for initial operational 
experience and the first triggered barrier was installed at Royston Drift 
Ftine on a rapidly retreating longwall face in a rectangular roadway of 
dimensions some 3.7m wide by 2.lm high. It was anticipated that due to the 
short design life of the face (some 4 months) early experience would be gained 
both in installation, movement and (importantly) withdrawal and transport and 
re-installation. The installation necessitated, because of the roadway size, 
4 disperser units and 2 flame sensors and these were disposed 2 over the 
travellinr•; track and 2 over the gate conveyor. Their positioning was such 
that the first sensor was 30/50m from the coal face and the most outbye disperser 
some 90/llOm from the face. 
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Suspension was by mono rail in each case and movement of the barrierwas conducted 
twice weekly. Experience has shown that this wa.s done in these early 
stages with 2 men takine time rather more than was expected with the equipment 
then being used and subsequent experience has enabled better handling arrange-
ments to be designed and the next installation is proving easier to handle. 
The first adverse operational experience was the unexpected spurious 
operation of a disperser after only four weeks of installation. This was 
proved to be a technical problem with the thermocouple wires in the detector 
head and a subsequently improved design has been evolved and there has been 
no further problem in this regard. 
Naturally a very close watch had to be kept for maintenance of nitrogen 
pressure (7 bar) and ensuring that no leakage of water was apparent. In 
this early operational experience neither of these possible failures 
manifested themselves. 
The spurious operation raised the problem of replacement and in order to 
continue to work the face legally with one barrier unoperational the colliery 
reverted to a light stone dust barrier installation. This experience highlighted 
the necessity for a spare unit not q_nly to be readily availai•le but easily 
transported to the site. Subsequently it has been recognised by the Inspectorate 
that in such an event production can continue provided that a replacement is 
erected with all possible speed. 
This first site at Royston hns been succeeded by two further retreatine faces 
at the same colliery and no further adverse experience has been gained. Face 
lengths have been about 90 metres and the faces have retreated at up to 50 
metres per week. 
The enrlier operational experience of ~andling difficulties has enabled refined 
designs of support and movement equipment to be developed and this is proving 
far more successful than the earlier type. 
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The second substantial operational experience was gained at Easington 
Colliery on a retreating longwall district in a roadway of similar dimensions 
to Royston. Handling has been improved as a result of the Royston experience 
and faciliti~>s are now one monorail and one running clamp on the permanent 
supports. 
No repetition of the spurious operation at Royston was encountered but at 
EasinGton as opposed to Royston a minor leak of nitrogen was detected after 
2 weeks. This eventualit,y had been foreseen and the barrier was able to stay 
operational by topping up with nitrogen from a nitrogen cylinder through the 
specially prepared Shrader valve. The cause of the leak has already been 
diagnosed as a badly designed seal and obviously other installations are having 
this design fault corrected. 
In both of these installations the designed maintenance schedules appear to have 
worked well and a copy of these is attached. 
GOHCLUSIONS 
\vhilst fortunately the triggered barrier has not had to be used in explosion 
circumstances it seems apparent at this early stage that it is reliable and 
able to do its job, that it is relativeJy easily advancnd in these especially 
rli~ficult circumstances and that the ~~intenance standards are working well. 
It is certainly clear that there must be the necessary training. 
It is believed that further operational experience will enable still further 
improvements in both transport and face handleability to be designed and it 
Heems that the triggered water barrier is a useful alternative to the light 
f;tone dunt barrier in specific conditions in the U.K. Indeed, it is well 
known that stone dust barriers are difficult to maintain with exactly the 
right quantities of suppressant but at least the triggered barrier as a 
desir,ned piece of equipment is certain to be of the required standard 
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at any time if properly maintained. Currently it is intended to instal 
the triggered ~~rrier in 9 other collieries in the U.K. to gain further 
operational experience. 
It is recognised as unfortunnte that because of the limited dimensions 
of the gallery during the development period that 4 dispersers have to be used 
in this sort or roadway. There is the possibility that an equally effective 
explosiofi suppression could be gained by using 2 dispersers instead of 4 and this 
would ~ortsiderably ease operational problems with no lessening of safety 
standai'da .. 
Ap:r'il 19Rl 
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MAINTENANCE 
NCB COLLIERY INSTALLATIONS 
In addition to carefully prescribed siting it is obvious that the Triggered Barriers' 
continued effectiveness will depend on proper maintenance. This should be included 
in the Manager's scheme for the mine. 
Maintenance falls into three classes depending on the expertise required:-
(a) Operational Mining surveillance; 
(b) Mechanical Engineering maintenance; 
(o) Electrical Engineering maintenance. 
Three separate disciplines are involved and the recommended frequency of the 
maintenance inspections depends on the depth of maintenance being conducted. 
It seems quite clear that the Mechanical and Electrical maintenance will be 
carried out by the Engineering staff of the mine. The Operational maintenance is 
a relatively superficial examination and does not require engineering staff to carry 
it out (unless defects are found). In view of the importance of ensuring the 
barriers are continuously in readiness it is suggested that these Operational 
examinations be carried out by Deputies on each of their pre-shift examinations in 
common with other district safety checks. 
f, I," ,, 
1 l,• 
L• aen1or u.niia Turn two positions 
adjoining Light Emitting Diodes (L.E.D.) 
should light IJ}omeat;u:il.y (Orte for each 
di•P•~•r in circuit artd one to indicate 
satiltaotort battery condition. Any 
deoreaae in brilliance of battery L.E.D. 
is an indication of low battery oondi-
tio4)• Return master key to "ON GUARD" 
position and remove key. 
. ', 
... 
I' 
.. ; 
'•· ··. ·; •' i·i 
" ... ' 
If any one of the L.E.D. 's fails to light 
arrange for an electrician to examine 
forthwith and report the fact in an 
appropriate book. 
Examination 
5. Press the push button marked 
"ON GUARD TEST" on the sensor unit. 
An adjoining L.E.D. should light for 
each water disperser in circuit. 
6. Check that the sensor unit is 
positioned at the correct distance 
from the disperser and the whole 
barrier at the correct distance from 
the face in accordance with the 
diagram attached to the installation. 
Check that the protective guard 
is fitted to the outbye end of the 
disperser. 
8. Examine for any other apparent 
defects. 
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SubseSBent Action 
If a L.E.D. fails to light arrange for 
an electrician to examine forthwith and 
then report the fact in an appropriate 
book. 
If positioning is found to be incorrect 
arrange to re-position in accordance with 
the installation diagram. Any movement 
undertaken must be in accordance with 
Notes for Guidance on Triggered Barrier 
Installations. Report any movement in an 
appropriate book. 
Report .any defects in an appropriate bookQ 
Report any apparent defects found forth-
with to the Colliery Mechanical Engineer 
or mechanic in charge of the mine or to 
the Colliery Electrical Engineer or the 
electrician in charge of the mine and thel\ 
report the fact in an appropriate book. 
EXAMINATION 'B' 
Examine.t}on_ 
1. Insert master key (engraved TBM) 
in aensor unit and:-
(i) Turn one position clockwise to 
"TRANSPORT" position. 
(ii) Pour hot water over thermocouple 
elements or immerse thermocouple 
elements in hot water. A L.E.D. on 
the sensor unit should light 
momentaril~ for each water disperser 
in oircuit. 
(iii) Return master key to "ON GUARD" 
position. 
(iv) Remove key. 
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Subseguent Action 
If a LoE.D. fails to light report the 
fact forthwith to the Colliery Electrical 
Engineer or the Electrician in charge of 
the mine and then report the fact in an 
appropriate booko 
2. Carry out item 4 of Examination 'A'· Report any apparent defects immediately to 
either the Colliery Mechanical JSlgineer 
Inspect and chock gu.3rda at 
outbye ends of disper:;::rs .. 
Inspect all eq:u.ipmen'IO for phys ioal 
damage. 
or the mechanio in charge of the mine or 
to the Colliery Electrical Engineer or 
the electrician in charge of the mine. 
R~pcrt a~s such ~ef~cts in the appropriate 
book. 
Repo~t ~~ defect~ in th~ appropriate book. 
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PLANNED MAJNTI!NANCE (MECIIANICAL) 
The maintenance is composed of two examinations with recommended frequencies:-
1) Elcam.ination 1 A 1 - weekly 
2) Examination ':B' - 2 yearly or at greater intervals (not exceeding 
26 months) as prescribed by the :Manager •a Scheme for the 
Mine. 
ElCAMINATION 'A' 
Examination 
1. Check that the Nitrogen pressure 
as indica ted. by the gauge is in the 
range 90-110lb p.s.i. 
2. Check that the water level is 
within 75 mm (3 ins) of the top of 
filling hole by removing water 
.filling plug on top of the unit at 
the highest end of the barrier. 
(The ability to tough the water 
surface with the tip of the finger 
indicates the water level is within 
the 
75 mm (3ins). Replace filler plug 
(after topping up if necessary) finger 
Subsequent Action 
If the pressure is outside this range 
arrange re-charging. 
To re-charge, remove the window from in 
front of the pressure gauge and connect & 
nitrogen cylinder through pressure 
reducing gear and Schraeder fitting to 
the valve below the gauge. 
THE UNIT MUST NOT :BE CHARGED TO A PRESSURE 
GREATER THAN 110lb psi. 
Top up if necessary using clean water. 
.&w&ni7tion 
3. Check that all suspension 
equi:pmen t is secure and undamaged. 
4o Generally check the complete 
installation for damage, loose bolts 
and fastenings. In particular check 
that ~ere are two split pins through 
each shear screw shroud and that 
there is no damage to the outer rim 
of ~~e shroud around the end plate. 
Never attempt to tighten the nuts 
on the shear screws. 
Check that the end guard is fitted 
to the outbye end of each disperser. 
ElCAMINATION 'B I 
1o Remove the complete installation 
from the mine for proof testing, 
hydraulic testing and re-furbishing. 
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SUbsequent Action 
Arrange rectification of any defects 
noted. 
Arrange rectification of any defects 
noted. 
I£ found defective replace the guard. 
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PLANNED MAINTENANCE (ELECTRICAL) 
The maintenance is composed of three examinations with recommended frequencies:-
1) Examination 'A' -weekly 
2) Ex:a.mina.tion ':a' - 3 monthly 
3) &a.znina.tion 'C' - 2 yearly or at 
26 months) as 
for the Mine. 
ElCAMINATION 'A' 
F.x:<ll'llination 
Insert master key {engraved T:BM) 
in sensor unit. Tum two posi tiona 
clockwise to 11TEST" position. 
Adjoining L.E.D.'s should light 
momentarily • (One for each 
disperser in circuit and one to 
indicate satisfactory battery 
condition.) 
2. Press push button marked "ON 
GUARD TEST" on sensor unit. An 
adjoining Light Emitting Diode 
(L.E.D.) should light for each water 
disperser.in circuit. 
grea. ter in terva.ls ·(not exceeding 
prescribed by the Manager's Scheme 
Subsequent Action 
If no light shows momentarily check 
for damage to cable or cable glands a.t 
both ends of the cable. Any decrease in 
brilliance of the battery L.E.D. is 
indicative of a low condition on the 
battery which should be changed. 
If no light shows momentarily check 
for damage to cable or cable glands a.t 
both ends of the cable. Any decrease in 
brilliance of the battery L.E.D. is 
indicative of a. low condition on the 
battery which should be changed. 
). Thoroughly examine a.ll electrical Arrange rectification of any defects 
noted. equipment externally for physical 
damage or corrosion. 
EXAMINATION 1B 1 
Examination 
1. Replace battery .in sensor unit. 
See section 8.3. 
2. Carry out Examination 'A' 
EXAMINATION 1 C1 
1o Remove the complete 
installation from the mine for proof 
testing and refurbishing. 
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Subsequent Action 
Follow instructions in section 8.3 of the 
Notes of Guidance. 
See action required. 
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Sh~, I?eVi::ew of the conference of the' Working Party on 
~le Dusts h&ld in L~bourg on 5.11.1981 
~ REliNim,. Versuchsgrube· Trerlloni&., Dortmund 
Ji. eubsltatrt~i~! pnopent'iion' o~ trH& 13· talks given t'.oday was devoted to the 
aul13~ oft tlr!i'~ ba:>niers in· line with the, decision on the work pro-
~ ~n· byv ~e"· Wom.ing Party on Flammable Dusts at its meeting on 
25·J:Ui.J.~8e-~. 'me:-~ t-hat a:s many as four different triggered barrier 
~l H~ been· d'l:Js-oribed' here· can be taken ae- a sign of European diver-
aUb7~. VI&• sthW.ll'i see-' that this should: in no wq be considered a drawback 
st<np~~ tb&ae'l ~- a• positively supplement' each other. 
Thtt tile· t'a'J.l4e• gtmn by Mr ,!!!!. and Mr Collinson, the triggered barrier 
d~ibped' l:iY.'J titS' SMRE in· the· United' KiflSdom is presented. It is planned 
tm I'l&PitfOe·· t&- present lightweight stone dust barriers with triggered 
oatmiens-· ih·· the'• Vi'cinity o.f'. production districts. The British system has 
th~· indi\Blputoole· advan~e of being exceptionally strong and. of not being 
v.err:r·d~&<when· r:elea.sed~a:ocidentally,.which we have heard has happe-
neci:~ duni~ teeti·ng•. Thee ba.Trier is very effective but not very cheap, 
esp&Oi·all'tf when: twe· det·eotors· and f·our dispersers have to be used. 
~:- tWkla" @iwn-, l:Jl;rt Mr· Browae;y;~ and: Mr Gof'fart describe the operation 
am·: tM.t!!i.Ugt- off the<-· t'ftggered' barrier deSJigned by INIEX in Belgium. It is 
a-. hig}ily· inteili:gent' and:: orig-inal solution to the problem. It will be 
int·ew~ti.tJs: t-n: olils:M"Ve· how,. this system fares when subjected to further 
t~&tti.bfi• ih'> ~~pl'a:cticai' conditions. 
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The Bergbau-Versuchsstrecke triggered barrier system presented by 
JI,Ir Scholl is a mature solution. Unfortunately, the original hopes of 
finding a "wonder" suppressant powder have not been fulfilled. An ex-
plosion in a mine roadway cannot be suppressed with one or two cylinders 
of suppressant dust as can be done in pipes. This barrier is therefore 
rather expensive because of the large number of cylinders required. The 
snopressant powder barrier is ideal for suppressing explosions which 
build up gradually, when used in conjunction with a fast-reacting ultra-
violet detector. As such, it has proved a success when tested both on 
roadway heading machines, as mentioned by Mr Scholl, and on winning ma-
chines Versuchsgrube Tremonia under a research project now approaching 
completion. 
In his talk, Mr Michelis outlined the principles of the Versuchsgrube 
Tremonia triggered barrier. This system, together with the barrier pro-
posed by INIEX, is without any doubt the cheapest solution to the pro-
blem of triggered barriers. Safety, too, should be sold at a reasonable 
price, and therefore preference should be given to a low-priced system 
whose there is equality on all other points. The Versuchsgrube Tremonia 
system has proved no less effective than the other systems in suppressing 
roadway explosions; its inherent drawbacks (should therefore be accepted). 
These are, in particular, the large amount of space it takes up compared 
with the BVS barrier, and its susceptibility to damage. It should be 
mentioned however that the Versuchsgrube Tremonia barrier also operates 
like a normal water barrier in the event that it is not triggered pro-
perly. 
Generally, as far as the problem of triggered barriers is concerned, it 
should be noted that in the Federal Republic of Germany there is no 
intention of replacing the water trough barrier system or parts of it 
with triggered barriers. Where an adequate area of roadway is available, 
the wide-action water barrier in particular provides such effective pro-
tection from explosions that it is scarcely possible to produce anything 
better for the same price. In the Federal Republic of Germany, therefore, 
the triggered barrier will only be used where water trough barriers, and 
especially the wide-action type, do not provide adequate protection 
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f~om explosions for lack of space or for other reasons. 
An inte~eliing example of this is the double explosions mentioned in the 
talks gi~~ b~ Mr Meerbach and Mr ~· First, Mr Meerbach gave an in-
ti'oduetiO!l to the difficulties encountered in the experimental treatment 
of this group of problems. Experiments with double explosions, which can 
d~i~itely occur in practice, as we know, have so far only been feasible 
in the Vers~ehsgrube Tremonia. Up to now, it has not been possible to 
eliain adequate protection from more than one explosions with conventional 
b~rtiers. Tbe BVS triggered barrier system, which Mr Faber spoke about, 
~des a. solution to this problem. Since this barrier remains intact if 
it is not triggered by an explosion, it provides suppressant for a secon-
d~ explosion. There is an urgent need for this interesting system to be 
t~ed irt the eXperiments with double explosions which are to be resumed 
a.t T:FeilaO-nia in -the foreseeable future. 
Mr !,ins~p£!h raised many problems in his general paper. Some of these, 
in particular the suppression of explosions occurring in the vicinity 
of -inning Machines; have now been solved by research projects. The pro-
pos$d studies of the principles underlying a coal dust explosion, how-
e~er, are of ~eneral interest. It is to be hoped that this work can soon 
be tackled on a larger scale in cooperation with all Western European 
institutes. 
We find it rather difficult to understand the aversion of our British 
colleagues to the water trough barrier, which was evident in this latter 
talk. AM al~eady mentidned, water trough barriers have been in operation 
in the Federal Republic of Germany for some twenty years now with excel-
lertt ~esults. They have also been introduced in other countries, in the 
meanti~. In Mr Jen~erek's paper, the design regulations drawn up in the 
Fede~al Re~ublic of Germany are described in detail: it is clear that 
these rules constantly need to be adapted to the state of the art as it 
beeomes more advanced. This work is in fact carried out continuously and 
will doubtless be brought to a successful conclusion. 
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Our French colleagues, too, are working more and more with water trough 
barriers, as we have seen from the talk given by Mr Giltaire and Mr 
Winter. Apart from a few minor details, the tests they carried out in the 
Iviontlaville gallery show the same results as those obtained previously 
in the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the installation of 
troughs, and as set out in the construction specifications mentioned by 
Mr Jenderek. It is very encouraging to see that physics is not confined 
by national frontiers and that the same results are obtained in France 
as in the Federal Republic of Germany. We can only back up the critical 
comments made by Mr Giltaire on the subject of "neutralization using 
water". 
The talks mentioned so far all dealt with the suppression of coal dust 
explosions. However, the question of how the development of coal dust 
explosions can be prevented altogether is at least of equal importance. 
The papers given by Mr Liberda and Mr Schnier dealt with this group of 
problems. The very interesting studies carried out by Mr Liberda confirm 
that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to draw conclusions about 
dust deposition in roadways from measurements of airborne dust. In our 
opinion, Mr Liberda's results on the circulation of dust deposits illus-
trate the inadequate of stone dustir;Jg as a means of controlling coal dust 
explosions. The realization that it is not feasible to use stone dust for 
neutralization in roadways continual falls of coal dust has led to the 
demand for neutralization with hygroscopic salts in such roadways in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. A sad example of the inadequacy of stone-
dusting for the prevention of coal dust explosions is the explosion at 
the Hansa hydromine two years ago. 
The use of hygroscopic dust binding faced major difficulties and was 
rejected by the mining companies in the Federal Republic of Germany to 
begin with. Mr Schnier's paper, however, shows the extent to which this 
method has now gained acceptance by the collieries and efficient opera-
tion achieved. The modern methods illustrated in the talk have remedied 
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ma~ of the ini~ial, disconcerting aspects of this process, and we still 
belie~~ ~~t it should be used in other countries of the Community in the 
interests of min~ safety. 
I hp~ I ~ve ma.na.ged. in the short time available to provide you with a 
sl}o¥1; review of l;he l3 interesting talks we have heard at today' s con-
ler.enc!il~, I P!ilieve that the conference organized by the Working Party on 
Fl~~ple Dijsts h~s shown that it is tackling and must continue to 
t~ckl~1 ~ l~ge number of subjects of exceptional importance to mines 
safety. T~nk you f 0r your attention. 
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